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The various sources of doctrine that practitioners use to conceptualize incident 
management result in inefficiencies, conflict, and misinterpretation. They can hinder or 
reduce operational success for incident management agencies and practitioners. Existing 
difficulties were validated through practitioner interviews and an in-depth literature 
review. Taking a more comprehensive and unified approach, a new incident management 
conceptual model is proposed and applied to several case examples. Conclusions, 
findings, and possible corrective measures are proposed to improve incident management 
doctrine. 
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This study is a qualitative assessment of current incident management doctrine. 
Amongst the various sources of foundational doctrine guiding the disciplines and the 
practitioners that compose the incident management enterprise a number of 
inconsistencies, gaps, redundancies, and obfuscations can be found that negatively impact 
the interoperability, the response efficacy, the conceptual understanding, and the potential 
positive growth of the enterprise. This study is divided into various sections consisting of 
discovery and analysis, synthesis, application, and findings. 
The discovery and analysis section consists of practitioner interviews and an in-
depth incident management literature review. The synthesis section consists of a proposal 
for a new model for the conceptual understanding of incident management that attempts 
to resolve and deconflict findings identified in the analysis section. The synthesis 
section’s proposed model consists of a rectified comprehensive lexicon with definitions 
and justifications, as well as conceptual diagrams with narrative descriptions that serve to 
illustrate various components of the incident management enterprise, system, and 
process. The synthesis section and output is followed by an application section where the 
proposed conceptual model is applied to four case examples (a major Stafford Act event, 
a non-Stafford Act event, a domestic terrorist non-Stafford Act event, and an off-shore 
non-Stafford Act event), which serves to help illustrate the applicability of the proposed 
conceptual model. The application section is then followed by conclusion and 
implementation sections. These sections outline the major findings related to incident 
management as an enterprise, system, and a process that have been identified and 
discovered throughout the various sections of this study, as well as recommended 
implementation measures for the synthesis output’s proposed conceptual model that 
might serve to address the findings outlined in the conclusions section. 
While the proposed lexicon and conceptual model is the primary output of this 
thesis, several major findings and conclusions related to incident management are made. 
The conclusions can broadly be categorized as doctrinal literature findings. Within the 
conclusions are two main topic areas, the first of which is specific to the relationship 
 xiv 
between crisis philosophy, the operational movement of resources, and the role of 
Department Operations Centers. The second topic area is related to deficiencies in 
existing foundational term and concept definitions.  
In addition to the previously identified findings and conclusions, a number of 
recommended implementation measures for the proposed conceptual model are suggested 
that might serve to address these findings and conclusions. The implementation measures 
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When considering incident management, whether as an enterprise, an endeavor, a 
system, an action, or an organizational model, it can in all cases be considered a tool for 
sense making. It allows practitioners to understand how to organize and act 
collaboratively to effect or create order from disorder. Any sense making tool is simply 
an idea that describes the relationships between what exists and the observers to form an 
organized pattern of thought that informs a paradigm of comprehension about their place 
within that world, system, or phenomena, and informs action. How one person applies a 
given sense making tool, or idea, may be different than the next person depending on 
how complete or granular the idea is, thus affecting paradigms differently. It could be 
said then (and has been said by Robert de Neufville in his description of John Dewey’s 
instrumentalism) that “the value of any idea is determined by its usefulness in helping 
people to adapt to the world around them.”1 
Based on the aforementioned description, if people have trouble adapting to the 
world, system, or phenomena that an idea is intended to describe then either their 
understanding of the idea is flawed, or the idea itself is incomplete or flawed. In relation 
to this study’s topic, incident management as a conceptual model, the “idea” is incident 
management, and the “world” is the enterprise of collaborative disciplines, functions, and 
organizations; the “system” is the processes of collaboration defined in the doctrine; and 
the “phenomena” are the various types of incidents being managed. However, whether it 
is arguments about Emergency Operations Center (EOC) vest colors, or confusion about 
the role of Department Operations Centers (DOCs), or inconsistencies in the action 
planning process across the nation, or confusion by some disciplines about the purpose or 
function of other disciplines, or the confusion about the differences between protection or 
prevention and mitigation or preparedness, or lack of agreement or consistency in the 
definition of tactics, operations, and strategy, or frustration over systemic mission-creep, 
or any other common frustration amongst practitioners as documented in after action 
                                                 
1 Robert de Neufville, “Instrumentalism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed January 1, 2016, http:// 
www.britannica.com/topic/instrumentalism. 
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reports from incidents large and small, it is proposed (and indeed the problem statement 
of this study) that the idea of incident management in its current manifestation is under-
encompassing. The instrumental value of incident management as an idea or sense 
making tool in its current form is found wanting. 
To make the idea of incident management as a tool for sense making more 
instrumental, or useful as a conceptual model, this study discovers, analyzes, and 
validates the problem. The study then provides a comprehensive step-by-step rebuild of 
its foundational and deficient components in an exploratory manner, an exercise in 
radical empiricism in other words, resulting in a proposed conceptual model. The 
proposed conceptual model is then applied to four case examples (a major Stafford Act 
event, a non-Stafford Act event, a domestic terrorist non-Stafford Act event, and an off-
shore non-Stafford Act event), which serves to help illustrate the applicability of the 
proposed conceptual model. The application section is then followed by conclusion and 
implementation sections.  
As Clive Barnett states in his paper on Foucault’s problemitization, “If we see 
problematizations as amplifications or intensifications of domains of engaged action, then 
the pressing analytical task is no longer viewed as one of critical disruption, but rather 
one of rearranging what is already known, of seeking to ‘make visible what is visible.’”2 
It seems incident management then, through the discovery and analysis section of this 
study, has been effectively problematized, what is left then is to rearrange what is already 
known and make visible what is visible with a new conceptual model. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Within the incident management enterprise, various conflicting and vague 
definitions, terminologies, roles and responsibilities, and concepts are found in policy, 
code, doctrine, and mission statements. This issue, combined with widely differing 
incident management organizational structures, has created philosophical, operational, 
and identity conflicts for incident managers. These conflicts force incident managers to 
                                                 
2 Clive Barnett, “On Problematization: Elaborations on a Theme in ‘Late Foucault,’” accessed January 
1, 2016, http://nonsite.org/article/on-problematization. 
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choose which competing interpretations or paradigms they subscribe to before, during, 
and after major incidents and events. The lack of clear understanding on the part of 
incident management practitioners of all types and all of their various stakeholders for 
what incident management’s primary principles, definitions, components, and concepts 
should be, particularly where their respective mission spaces interface, has created 
conflict, confusion, and frustration amongst practitioners and may be hindering 
successful incident management endeavors (during incidents and day-to-day). This 
problem is corroborated through practitioner interviews in the discovery and analysis 
section of this study.  
Discovering, illuminating, describing, defining, binding, and categorizing the 
various aspects and components of the incident management enterprise will help to 
identify and de-conflict the current narratives and mission spaces within the burgeoning 
and well-established disciplines that compose the incident management enterprise and 
promote consistent expectations for practitioners and organizations. This process will 
help to discern a more satisfying and appropriate sense-making model for understanding 
the components and concepts of incident management.  
Through the course of this research, a validation that in fact a pervasive pattern of 
vagueness, obfuscation, and inconsistency in the existing incident management doctrine 
does exist is provided through discovery and analysis, with specifically categorized and 
identified discrepancies. This process allowed for a proposed sense-making framework 
and conceptual model with bounded domains of incident management mission spaces, 
activities, components, defined phases of incident management, and methods for 
determining the knowledge, skills, and abilities of incident managers (all variants). More 
importantly, it will hopefully allow for greater clarity and context for further discussion 
about the most appropriate way forward for the various aspects of incident management. 
A sense-making framework and conceptual model outlining the various incident 
management components, mission spaces, paradigms and narratives, and their 
contributing sources will hopefully help in identifying current and potential points of 
conflict amongst mission priorities, and help to stem the tide of unproductive future 
divergence in paradigms. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the current gaps between reality and literature, overlaps, obfuscations, 
and areas lacking clarity in the various incident management doctrine definitions, 
components, and concepts?  
Is a more satisfying and appropriate sense-making framework and conceptual 
model for understanding the existing concepts and components of incident management 
and the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of incident managers available to address 
the gaps, overlaps, obfuscations, and areas of lacking clarity in current doctrine? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN  
The following sections are a description of the methods and processes used in 
researching the topic of incident management. This description outlines specifically what 
was studied, how the sources were identified and prioritized, the known limits of the 
research process, which data sources specifically were chosen, the specific research type 
or mode employed, the resulting output, and a conclusion about the process in general. 
This section is designed to allow the reader to understand and trace the process of logic 
for this study.  
1. Selection 
The extent literature that makes up the current incident management doctrine and 
guidance is the target of analysis. The samples of doctrine reviewed demonstrate 
common and prevalent pattern phenomena. The problem statement and justification for 
analysis are validated through practitioner interviews approved through the Naval 
Postgraduate School Human Subject Research Institutional Review Board (IRB). The 
corroboration of the broad sample of experienced practitioners serves to solidify and 
illustrate the pervasiveness and breadth of the problem. As the problem is assumed to 
stem from a lack of guidance, definition, and doctrine clarity within the extent literature, 
the best source of analysis is the literature itself. A new proposed incident management 
conceptual model, serving as the synthesis of the interviews and literature review, are 
then applied to case example illustrations of a major Stafford Act event, a domestic non-
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Stafford Act event, a domestic terrorist non-Stafford Act event, and an off-shore non-
Stafford Act event. These event types were chosen specifically for their breadth, 
relevance, and comprehensive spectrum of application. The Stafford Act constitutes the 
statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain 
to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FEMA programs, and the 
guidance that outlines disaster types that local and state government eligibility for federal 
reimbursement for response activities.3 
2. Limits 
The specific or assumed causes of any identified doctrine deficiencies or trends 
are not evaluated specifically. This study simply demonstrates that they exist and 
provides recommended methods for going forward by proposing new frames and models 
of perspective. Additionally, the synthesis is a qualitative subjective approach of radical 
empiricism and an inductive Socratic method of hermeneutic exploration. Due to its 
subjective nature, this method inherently lends itself to critique, which is expected and 
invited, as the intent of the synthesis is to encourage, incite, and inspire an academic and 
professional dialogue of Socratic dialectic debate that will ultimately result in more 
effective, pragmatic, and appropriate incident management doctrine.  
3. Data Sources 
Practitioner interview data was gathered to validate that the problem identified in 
the problem statement is common and pervasive. An inductive and categorical analysis of 
missing, confusing, overlapping, or obfuscated elements amongst the extent literature 
was identified in the literature review serving as data points. Additionally, as validation 
for the utility of the inductive synthesis (proposed incident management conceptual 
model), case example after action reports of a major Stafford Act event, a non-Stafford 
Act event, a domestic terrorist non-Stafford Act event, and an off-shore non-Stafford Act 
event were evaluated through the lens of the proposed model’s concepts.  
                                                 
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities (FEMA 592) (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2007), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf. 
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4. Type and Mode of Analysis 
Using a qualitative research paradigm and an inductive systematic method to 
accomplish practitioner interviews and a literature review and analysis, this study finds 
and catalogs the gaps between doctrine and reality, as well as persistent patterns of 
overlaps, obfuscations, and areas lacking clarity in the various incident management 
components found in doctrine. This study then provides a new proposed conceptual 
model based on an empirical inductive Socratic synthesis and evaluation of cogent 
aspects of currently existing perspectives to fill in the identified gaps in the extent 
literature and doctrine discovered in the interviews and literature review. The specific 
steps are as follows: 
• Complete interviews of incident management practitioners to test the 
hypothesis that the problem exists, and if it exists, its potential scope. 
• Conduct an in depth analysis of the extent literature identified in the 
literature review specifically to identify and catalogue patterns of 
confusion, conflict, lack of clarity, and lack of definition. 
• Synthesize the literature analysis and propose a rectified incident 
management lexicon and components list. 
• Conceptually graph or model the proposed incident management lexicon 
and components and provide appropriate explanatory narrative.  
• Examine applicability of proposed incident management lexicon, 
components, models, and graphs through case example application. 
• Provide conclusions and implementation recommendations for the 
proposed incident management conceptual model for understanding the 
concepts of incident management. 
5. Output 
The proposed conceptual model is a series of visual conceptual charts 
accompanied by narrative descriptions, as well as a proposed lexicon of definitions and 
definition justifications making up a sense-making model to provide a better definition of 
the various components and concepts of incident management followed by 
recommendations for implementation. The provided conceptual model and framework 
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will improve the definition and hopefully stymie the continued future persistence of the 
negative patterns and findings identified in the literature review and analysis.  
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II. INTERVIEWING INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
PRACTITIONERS 
To prove that the problem described in the problem statement exists, and its 
potential scope or pervasiveness, interviews of a sample of experienced incident 
management practitioners from across the incident management enterprise were 
interviewed. Employing the interview process ensures that the voices of those who are 
most intimately familiar with the source data (incident management doctrine) and who 
have experience implementing it are heard and integrated in to the analysis of the extent 
literature. The experiences, lessons learned, and resulting opinions and perspectives of 
these experienced practitioners are in turn extremely valuable, and an absolutely integral 
part of this study and its results. The findings and conceptual model that is this study’s 
product are meant to directly serve and enhance the capabilities and processes of the 
interviewees and practitioners like them. The interviews generally lasted about an hour, 
with a couple of them going nearly two hours long, which is over 10 hours of answers. 
Considering only twelve questions were asked, it is a lot of information. While it is not 
feasible to completely distill all of the tremendous and interesting insights provided by 
the interviewees, and a number of very interesting comments and trends were discovered 
during the interviews that would likely be of interest to the incident management 
enthusiast, many were very subjective in nature and were not suitable as distilled 
findings. The value of some of these more subjective trends of interest are intended to be 
captured within this study’s proposed conceptual model.  
A. SELECTING THE PRACTITIONERS 
To obtain a diverse sample of the incident management enterprise, practitioners 
were selected from federal, state, county, and municipal agencies from disciplines (or 
with experience in disciplines), such as emergency management, firefighting, law 
enforcement, public health, emergency medical services, and several branches of the 
military. The practitioners were each selected by the author of this study because they 
were known to the author as personal connections with extensive or significant 
experience, credentials, qualifications, education, position, or a combination thereof. The 
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seven interviewees have a collective 150 years of experience within the incident 
management enterprise. While the focus of this thesis is public sector incident 
management structures and concepts, which may be analogous to private sector 
implementation, it should be noted that private sector incident management practitioners 
were not part of the interview sample.  
The majority of the practitioners selected currently hold positions in California, 
partially due to convenience for the interviewer; however, this dynamic presents 
advantages and disadvantages. California has one of the most robust, renowned, and 
established statewide emergency management systems, and such, perhaps provides a 
greater granularity in the context of experience the interviewed practitioners have. 
Additionally, California is subject to some of the most frequent large natural disasters and 
incidents in the country, which allows practitioners across the state to apply their 
knowledge and discipline in real world events relatively often. The downside to this 
selection is that every state is not California, and may not be able to or interested in 
implementing a similar system to California, and the experiences and analogies the 
interviewees provide may not be completely analogous to other states. Fortunately, this 
study does not necessarily seek to promote California’s statewide emergency 
management system, and many of the practitioners have experience in positions outside 
of the state of California that helps to broaden the value of their perspective.  
The following events are a small example or sample of the type of events the 
interviewees have participated in: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane 
Sandy, Deep Water Horizon, Northridge earthquake, Napa County earthquake, the Lake 
County wildfires, the Tea, Zaca, and Jesusita fires in Santa Barbara County, and Y2K 
preparations. This list is not meant to inspire an “appeal to authority” logic fallacy, but 
merely to demonstrate that the practitioner perspectives are relevant to current incident 
management doctrine. To avoid the “appeal to authority”4 logic fallacy, the names and 
                                                 
4 (Just because an authority says something does not make it inherently true.) Jesse Richardson, Andy 
Smith, and Sam Meaden, “Your Logical Fallacy Is…,” Flip Creative, accessed July 25, 2016, https://your 
logicalfallacyis.com/appeal-to-authority. 
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positions of the interviewees have been specifically omitted from the published version of 
this study. 
B. TYPES OF QUESTIONS 
The questions, which are listed in Appendix A, were designed to elicit insight and 
experiences related to incident management doctrine and guidance documents. The first 
questions were designed to encourage the interviewees to reflect on their experience and 
the events they have responded to or participated in, and they are then considered primed 
for analysis. The following several questions were designed to elicit critical analysis of 
the interviewees’ experience participating in the response aspects of incident 
management, and how doctrine or guidance documents aided or hindered their 
experience. The next questions were designed to elicit critical analysis of the 
interviewees’ broader experience applying incident management doctrine and guidance 
documents during the entire incident management process individually, organizationally, 
in an inter-agency capacity, or as an individual agency. The final questions were designed 
to elicit thoughtful reflection on pivotal elements of success. 
Ultimately, the interview was designed to allow a healthy sample of incident 
management enterprise practitioners with significant experience to explore critically their 
frustrations, successes, and general perspectives of existing incident management 
doctrine and guidance with the outcome of identifying areas of consistency, 
corroboration, or correlation. The questions were designed specifically not to incite any 
specific bias or elicit answers that could be used in a “gotcha” style critique of the 
practitioners themselves. The interviewees were encouraged to answer the questions with 
as much brevity or elaboration as necessary that they were comfortable in answering.  
C. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
The outcome of these interviews is a list of insightful findings and 
recommendations, as well as a consistent trend of corroboration. Although, a few 
interesting areas of divergence arose amongst the interviewee’s answers. The following 
sections discuss the answers and responses, disagreements and inconsistencies, intriguing 
comments and trends, as well as a distillation of the results.  
 12 
1. Useful Sources of Doctrine 
When asked which incident management publications, guidance, or pieces of 
doctrine were most useful to them throughout their careers, the following were 
mentioned: ICS Field Operating Guide, The National Response Framework, the 2011 
NIMS Training Documents, The California Standardized Emergency Management 
System Function/Section Specific Guidance, Coast Guard Publication 3-28: Incident 
Management and Crisis Response,5 The FEMA Action Planning Guide, National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and 
Business Continuity/Continuity of Operations Programs, and NIMS. Several interviewees 
responded that there was no one document that has been particularly helpful.  
2. Distilling the Results 
Not only did these interviews validate and corroborate the problem statement for 
this study, and the purpose for conducting them in fact, but they also illuminated a 
number of additional interesting findings related to gaps and deficiencies within incident 
management doctrine and the enterprise’s conceptual understanding of itself. It should be 
noted that due to the limited number of interviewees, the following findings are purely 
preliminary and interesting as potential points for further investigation. The following list 
of findings is derived from the interviews in their entirety (many of these findings are not 
outlined specifically in the aforementioned overview for brevity purposes): 
• Practitioners consistently agree that discipline and cultural differences are 
pervasive because of a lack of common foundational incident management 
training amongst all practitioners within the enterprise. 
• Many practitioners felt that a difference existed between appropriate and 
inappropriate mission creep. For example, filling the role of a city without 
being asked or expressed permission by a county when the city has no 
capability to execute its roles and responsibilities for public safety is an 
example of potentially appropriate mission creep. Whereas, an EOC 
redundantly, inadvertently, or purposely directing tactical operations in the 
field or at the incident is an example of inappropriate mission creep.  
                                                 
5 U.S. Coast Guard, Incident Management and Crisis Response (Publication 3-28) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2014), https://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/CG_Pub_3-28.pdf. 
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• All the interviewees expressed in some way that incident management 
champions and authorities with legitimacy need to be identified and given 
a voice and medium for frequent national dialogue and mentorship.  
• Many practitioners feel that a systemic practice of accountability for 
incident management organizations and agencies needs to be more 
nationally consistent to ensure best practices are being identified, poor 
practices are being identified and reduced, and capabilities and operational 
capacity is being increased nationwide. 
• Many incident management practitioners do not consider themselves part 
of a larger collective “enterprise,” or are unaware that they are. 
• Amongst some practitioners is a perception that FEMA is not a suitable 
incident management lead. It only has legitimacy in the consequence 
management aspects of incident management, and no legitimacy in the 
crisis management and threat management (pre-incident) side of things.  
• Practitioners agree that mission spaces have not been bound well in 
current doctrine. Practitioners do not feel that FEMA has an interest in 
bounding mission space, nor professional organizations (such as 
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)). A better 
venue for national dialogue is needed to determine best bounding of 
mission spaces.  
• While some interviewees feel that the definition of various incident 
management disciplines, actions, event types, activity levels, etc., and the 
differences between them need to be more clearly delineated in 
foundational documents, others feel that the problem lies in the 
implementation of current doctrine. In either case, it seems the problem 
lies with the doctrine, in that it is not clear or prescriptive enough to be 
implemented consistently.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Crisis” is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning.6  
~ James A. Robinson 
Since the end of World War II, Congress and Presidents have debated, 
formulated, and revised administrative responsibilities for emergency 
management.7  
~ Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea 
 
A. DISCERNING EMERGENCY AND INCIDENT MANAGERS 
Based on this study’s practitioner interviews, it is apparent that disagreement, 
confusion, and a lack of clarity occur about whether incident management and emergency 
management are synonymous concepts. Some of the practitioners used the terms 
interchangeably, while others considered incident management to be under the umbrella 
of emergency management, and others felt that emergency management was merely one 
component of incident management. Based on this phenomenon, it seems that the best 
course of action in determining what the conceptual model for managing incidents and 
events should be is to discern between these two terms in the existing literature. The 
exploration of the leading doctrine and literature on this topic will then likely reveal the 
sources of other relevant components and areas of needed definition or exploration.  
The research available on the topic of emergency and incident management 
narratives and paradigms specifically is extremely limited. However, the available 
research, literature, and data available on emergency management as a profession and its 
evolving mission space in general are extremely broad. This review is therefore a 
comparative analysis of the various sources that define explicitly and implicitly the roles, 
responsibilities, and expectations of emergency management, and how they inform 
                                                 
6 James A. Robinson, “Crisis,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 3 (1968): 510–514. 
7 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options (RL33369) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2006), 4. 
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various narratives and paradigms within incident management that may be congruent or 
incongruent. This analysis will hopefully help to define new emergency and incident 
management paradigms and narratives and inform a model for categorizing elements of 
those newly defined narratives and paradigms.  
This literature review is separated into seven categories that address sources of 
explicit and implicit expectations of emergency management within incident 
management, where specific laws, funding requirements, policies, plans, and procedures 
exist, where they are consistent or inconsistent, and which types of emergency 
management and incident management narratives they inform. The various sources of 
explicit and implicit roles, responsibilities, and expectations of emergency and incident 
management lend themselves to being interpreted and applied differently and selectively 
amongst practitioners, thus creating various paradigms and narratives that then inform 
mission priorities that may be in conflict with the mission priorities of other organizations 
with a different paradigm.  
B. EXPECTATIONS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMERGENCY 
AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
The definition of explicit according to Merriam-Webster is: “Fully revealed or 
expressed without vagueness, implication, or ambiguity and leaving no question as to 
meaning or intent.”8 An explicit expectation in regards to emergency management for the 
purpose of this analysis is one that outlines specific requirements, actions, or roles and 
responsibilities. Thousands of explicit and implicit expectations are likely placed on 
emergency and incident management, for ease of classification and evaluation, a 
categorization of the sources of those expectations should be established. For 
simplification purposes, the most obvious categories of expectations are used:  
• federal government level plans, policies, and regulations  
• state government level plans, policies, and regulations 
• local government level plans, policies, and regulations 
                                                 
8 Merriam-Webster OnLine, s.v. “Explicit,” accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/explicit. 
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• emergency management grant guidance 
• professional association guidance  
• accreditation and training institution guidance 
• academic and practitioner documents  
In the following subsections, each of the aforementioned source categories of 
emergency and incident management expectations are explored. 
1. Federal Government Level Plans, Policies, and Regulations 
The following literature is the most relevant list of federal level documents that 
establish explicit and implicit emergency management and incident management 
expectations: the National Preparedness Goal,9 the National Response Framework,10 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan,11 Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan: An 
Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,12 The National Incident 
Management System,13 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact,14 The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002,15 and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act of 2006.16 These documents are the guiding federal documents for emergency 
                                                 
9 Jeh Johnson, National Preparedness Goal, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), 2015), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97 
e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. 
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 3, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-
1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf. 
11 Michael Chertoff, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), 2009), http://emilms.fema.gov/IS821/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf. 
12 Todd M. Keil, Emergency Services Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-emergency-services.pdf. 
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 
14 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, art. II (1996) http://www.emac 
web.org/index.php/learnaboutemac/emac-legislation. 
15 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
hr_5005_enr.pdf. 
16 Susan M. Collins, “S.3721—Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, 109th 
Congress (2005–2006),” Congress.gov, July 25, 2006, https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/ 
senate-bill/3721. 
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management that specifically address emergency management as a capability, discipline, 
organizational structure, or activity.  
The casual reader and emergency management practitioner might think the 
aforementioned list is missing key documents, such as the Stafford Act, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive five (HSPD-5), and various presidential policy directives, 
such as PPD-1. However, none of those documents specifically address emergency 
management as a discipline or function, nor do they address emergency managers, crisis 
managers, risk managers, or incident managers as practitioners having any specific role.  
Ultimately, at the federal level, the explicit expectations, roles, responsibilities, 
authorities, and definitions of various incident management (using the term broadly) 
practitioners and their various professions are nuanced, sometimes convoluted, 
occasionally in conflict, and often add or build upon each other. The terms emergency 
management, crisis management, incident management, business continuity, and 
emergency and disaster preparedness seem to be used fairly interchangeably, and distinct 
delineation amongst these terms is very illusive. Greater definition of these various terms 
and practices would be extremely beneficial in federal documents to help guide 
appropriate response, coordination, and professional distinction. Emergency management 
seems to have become the catch-all term for each of these very different aspects.  
2. State Government Level Plans, Policies, and Regulations 
Analyzing and synthesizing the various explicit definitions and delineations of 
emergency management terms and concepts from each of the 50 American states, while 
potentially useful, is extremely arduous and probably not entirely necessary. Most, if not 
all states, have a state emergency management organization of some sort and have an 
emergency operations plan of some sort. Within those plans are descriptions of state 
emergency management personnel and local emergency managers, as well as the function 
of EOCs and their relationship with the field. The similarities and homogeneity amongst 
plans at the state level in regards to terms and definitions is likely due in part to the 
inherent vagueness and scope of state level plans, as well as the fact that they primarily 
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use the same guiding federal documents and language as a framework. However, some 
small differences should be noted. 
To synthesize some of the primary key differences amongst states quickly, 
language specific to four very different state emergency operations plans are highlighted: 
Alabama, California, Colorado, and New York. These four states were chosen due to the 
fact that their plans were easily accessible, were in very different regional geographic 
areas, had widely varied plans in scope and character, and were states with very different 
hazard and threat profiles.  
Evaluating these four EOPs provides great comparison and contrast and an 
example of how different and nuanced the terms are from one state to the next. One 
foundational aspect about the comparison of these documents is in the authority for 
command and control that they respectively give to the EOCs. Additionally, the 
continued lack of definition for emergency management and emergency managers is 
particularly interesting. Only vague references to emergency managers appeared 
specifically in any of these documents, and no reference at all in some.  
3. Local Government Level Plans, Policies, and Regulations 
The proverbial rubber meets the road in local government emergency 
management. Many federal documents highlight the fact that emergency management 
happens at the local level. Interestingly, the local level is where the majority of 
discrepancies between documents and plans happen and where lack of continuity and 
inconsistency amongst emergency management paradigms seems to have the most 
prevalence. Even amongst neighboring jurisdictions, the major policy, doctrine, and plan 
discrepancies might hinder effective integration and cooperation during regional events, 
and skew the expectations of emergency management stakeholders amongst the 
jurisdictions. As an example, three California Bay Area neighboring jurisdictions’ 
emergency operations plans were evaluated: San Mateo County, San Francisco 
City/County, and Santa Clara County. 
One key item to point out about all these local emergency operations plans is that 
they often describe what emergency management is, but not what emergency managers 
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are. While examining how emergency managers are defined in state legislature is not 
within the scope of this study’s research, this issue remains an interesting observation. 
Furthermore, the disparity between the identified phases of emergency management and 
the roles and responsibilities that fall under the associated phases for emergency 
management is a major issue, especially in terms of a coordinated response. It also 
creates some significant differences in expectations of services provided and performance 
metrics from key stakeholders and organizational leadership. If one emergency 
management office is tasked with prevention and protection responsibilities and another 
is not, then that difference could potentially create some significant operational confusion 
and incompatibilities. When this issue persists in neighboring jurisdictions, as it does in 
these three, it can create major and obvious paradigm differences amongst emergency 
management practitioners as well. 
4. Emergency Management Federal Grant Guidance 
When trying to get to the bottom of a difficult problem or issue, it is often 
recommended that people “follow the money.” In emergency management, the money 
comes from a federal grant passed through the states down to the local level. This grant is 
called the emergency management performance grant (EMPG).  
Given that “emergency management performance” is in the name of the grant, if 
the money (grant dollars) is followed to look for a definition of emergency management 
or to discern what it is emergency managers do, it might appear that they do everything. 
It seems that effective emergency management performance is synonymous with 
everything that falls under the national preparedness goal, inclusive of all its missions and 
capabilities. In addition, the fact that response equipment, cyber security equipment, and 
other detection equipment combined with the various national preparedness missions and 
capabilities may lead to the belief that emergency management includes the full spectrum 
of emergency response, support, coordination, command, and control. In this situation, 
following the money might not be the best method for discernment or inquiry. 
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5. Professional Associations 
The NFPA has created a document outlining standards for emergency 
management and business continuity programs titled “NFPA 1600: Standard on 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs,” which defines 
disaster and emergency management synonymously as “the ongoing process to prevent, 
mitigate, prepare for, respond to, maintain continuity during, and to recover from, an 
incident that threatens life, property, operations, or the environment.”17 Interestingly, this 
document includes prevention but not protection in the definition. Meanwhile, the NFPA 
1600 definition for incident management and incident management systems is more 
broad and overarching stating, “The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, 
procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure and 
designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents.”18 Additionally, under 
the response section of NFPA 1600, a great effort is made to allow flexibility in the title 
of emergency management practitioners. It recognizes that the program coordinator for 
the emergency management program may hold the title emergency manager (in the 
public sector), business continuity manager (in the private sector), or emergency 
management program coordinator as examples.19 It is stated, “the program coordinator 
shall be appointed by the entity’s leadership and authorized to develop, implement, 
administer, evaluate, and maintain the program.”20 The list of assessment tool 
recommendations includes issues like budgets, records management, planning, risk 
assessments, impact analysis, resource needs analysis, performance objectives, plans 
specifically addressing prevention, mitigation, crisis communication and public 
information, warning notifications and communication, operations procedures, EOC 
                                                 
17 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management 
and Business Continuity Programs (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2013), 5, http:// 
www.nfpa.org/assets/files/AboutTheCodes/1600/1600-13-PDF.pdf. 
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 25. 
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procedures, an incident management system, and emergency operations/response plan, a 
training program, an exercise program, and program maintenance measures.21 
IAEM is probably the most recognized professional organization of emergency 
management practitioners with over 9,000 worldwide members. IAEM is “dedicated to 
promoting the ‘Principles of Emergency Management’ and representing professionals 
whose goals are saving lives and protecting property and the environment during 
emergencies and disasters.”22 Their mission is to “serve its members by providing 
information, networking and professional opportunities, and to advance the emergency 
management profession.”23 Additionally, IAEM certifies emergency management 
practitioners through a process requiring a college education (not necessarily in the 
discipline of emergency management), a written test on basic emergency management 
conceptual familiarization, and proof of experience and career field contributions. IAEM 
created the certified emergency manager program to “raise and maintain professional 
standards for emergency managers.”24 In the late 1980s, FEMA awarded IAEM funds to 
produce a report on how to accomplish this test. A council of “subject matter experts” 
called the “professional standards advisory council” was established representing various 
disciplines and functions related to or considered “aspects” of emergency management 
(see Figure 1). The definition of professional benchmarks (accomplishments, 
certifications, trainings, experience, etc.) was deemed the most appropriate way to create 
professional standards, and then a certification program that documents their 
qualifications and their attainment of those benchmarks. 
                                                 
21 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management 
and Business Continuity Programs, 25–38. 





Figure 1.  1989–93 NCCEM Professional Standards.25  
For four years in the early 1990s, IAEM gathered insight from professionals with 
all-hazards experience, from jurisdictions of every type and size, and from various sister 
disciplines. This discernment resulted in an analytical study of emergency management 
as a profession. The analytical study led to a list of knowledge, skills, and abilities 
(KSAs) that the council deemed needed to accomplish consistent job duties and vital 
                                                 
25 Source: “History of the AEM and CEM, Associate Emergency Manager and Certified Emergency 
Manager Program,” accessed October 14, 2015, http://www.iaem.com/page.cfm?p=certification/history-of-
cem. 
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tasks of emergency managers. IAEM’s Professional Standards Advisory Council based 
the certification requirements on these KSAs.26 
An important aspect of the IAEM certification is that they are certifying members 
as part of the professional body of emergency management, and not the discipline of 
emergency management. As mentioned previously, the members tasked with creating the 
certification came from several various disciplines relating to emergency management. 
Additionally, IAEM promotes the “principles of emergency management” as established 
through Emergency Management Institute (EMI) (discussed in more depth in the next 
section). These principles clearly state that they apply not to the discipline or individual 
attributes of an emergency manager, but to the profession of emergency management, a 
vital distinction.27 Thus, the IAEM emergency management certification is inherently 
broad in scope and encompasses KSAs across a wide ranging field of practitioners who 
would not, through this certification process, become uniform in performance or 
individual practitioner capacity. Perhaps most interestingly, nowhere in the IAEM 
literature or certification process is a definition of what emergency managers are or what 
they do specifically; principles for the profession and prescribed requirements for being 
certified as an emergency management professional are defined, but what an emergency 
manager is or does, and certainly not how they do it, are not. 
The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) is a professional 
association made up of state emergency management directors and leadership. NEMA’s 
focus is on national leadership, policy, and engagement regarding comprehensive 
emergency management. NEMA serves as an information and assistance resource for 
emergency management agencies and practitioners. Additionally, NEMA seeks to 
improve and create “strategic partnerships, innovative programs, and collaborative policy 
positions.”28 
                                                 
26 “History of the AEM and CEM, Associate Emergency Manager and Certified Emergency Manager 
Program.” 
27 “Emergency Management Principles,” 2007, 1, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprinciples. 
asp.  
28 “What is NEMA?,” accessed October 15, 2015, https://www.nemaweb.org/index.php/about/what-is-
nema.  
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In the strategic plan, NEMA states that its purpose is, “To develop the 
partnerships and initiatives necessary to improve the nation’s capabilities to protect the 
public through prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery from all 
emergencies, disasters, and threats to our homeland.”29 It is an interesting reference to 
five phases of emergency management in which mitigation and prevention are divided 
into two phases. Interestingly, other places on their website reference only three or four 
phases, demonstrating a lack of consistency.30 Once again, nowhere on NEMA’s 
webpage or in their strategic plan do they define what emergency managers are or what 
they do. 
Ultimately, these various professional organizations leave wanting the discerning 
mind searching to divine what emergency managers do specifically, or what the 
discipline of emergency management entails as opposed to the larger profession, or the 
difference between emergency management, crisis management, incident management, 
business continuity, or community preparedness. To paint the picture a little clearer, an 
analogy can be drawn to carpentry and building houses. NFPA states what components 
are in a finished house. IAEM certifies someone as competent to work on a construction 
site, while NEMA promotes house building and discusses houses at length. However, 
none of these organizations seem to be discerning between electricians, plumbers, 
roofers, contractors, construction managers, framing carpenters, and finish carpenters.  
6. Accreditation and Training Institutions 
In 2007, FEMA’s Emergency Management Higher Education Project, under 
guidance of FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI), established a panel of 
practitioners and academics to develop basic foundational principles of emergency 
management. This project was endeavored upon because while numerous books, articles, 
and papers referred to “principles of emergency management,” nowhere in any of the 
literature on the subject was a consensus reached on a definition of what these principles 
                                                 
29 “What is NEMA?.” 
30 Ibid. 
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were specifically.31 The panel came up with eight “principles of emergency 
management” to be used as a guide for the development of a doctrine of emergency 
management. These principles have been adopted by the major emergency management 
professional organizations, FEMA, and the EMI, as well as a number of other 
organizations.32  
Neither EMI, which applies the principles of emergency management, nor EMAP 
(emergency management accreditation program), which accredits emergency 
management programs, seem to have a clear definition of what emergency managers do 
specifically. They make reference to the profession of emergency management, and the 
necessary components of a successful emergency management program, which are 
composed of efforts, capabilities, and programs across a wide array of disciplines, 
departments, and organizations. A lack of definition about the scope of authority, the 
specific actions, or the roles and responsibilities of the emergency manager still seems 
lacking.  
7. Academic and Practitioner Documents 
Hogue and Bea perhaps said it best when they said, “Since the end of World War 
II, Congress and Presidents have debated, formulated, and revised administrative 
responsibilities for emergency management.”33 Several scholarly journals, academic 
papers, and practitioner articles discuss emergency management, crisis management, 
consequence management, incident management, business continuity, and community 
preparedness broadly and conceptually. For example, in 2007 (updated in 2008), Dr. 
Wayne Blanchard developed the 1,366 page “Guide to Emergency Management and 
Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, 
Executive Orders & Legislation,” which provides 25 emergency management definitions, 
15 incident management definitions, 23 crisis definitions, and 20 crisis management 
                                                 
31 “Emergency Management Principles,” 1. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hogue and Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization: Historical 
Developments and Legislative Options, 4. 
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definitions.34 It did not, however, stipulate which of the definitions was right, more 
accurate, or most appropriate. Very few academic or practitioner documents attempt to 
delineate or discern between these terms and concepts, and even fewer attempt to define 
the specific roles, responsibilities, authorities, or discipline differences inherent within 
each.  
George Haddow, Jane Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola have written a 
comprehensive book titled Introduction to Emergency Management which, as of 2013, is 
now in its fifth edition.35 These authors have over 100 years of combined experience in 
the profession of emergency management at all levels including senior FEMA positions. 
In their book, they state, “The definition of emergency management can be extremely 
broad and all encompassing. Unlike other, more structured disciplines, it has expanded 
and contracted in response to events, congressional styles, and leadership styles.”36 They 
continue to provide a “simple” definition of emergency management as, “a discipline that 
deals with risk and risk avoidance.”37 Then they add, “Risk represents a broad range of 
issues and includes an equally diverse set of players.”38 Additionally, in the forward for 
this book, a letter is written by James Lee Witt, the former director of FEMA, which 
describes emergency management as a discipline, and promotes a philosophy of risk 
reduction and community protection.39 This description introduces the question of 
difference between risk managers and emergency managers. Lastly, in the introduction, 
Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola state that emergency management is a profession and an 
academic discipline.40 However, the table of contents breaks emergency management in 
                                                 
34 Wayne B. Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, 
Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, & Legislation (Washington, DC: 
FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, 2008). 
35 George Haddow, Jane Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management 
(United Kingdom: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013). 
36 Ibid., 1. 
37 Ibid., 2. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., forward. 
40 Ibid., xvii. 
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to five “disciplines,” mitigation, communication, preparedness, response, and recovery.41 
Ultimately, while this book is a tremendous resource for understanding the profession of 
emergency management, it has many term inconsistencies and does little to discern the 
difference between the profession and the discipline of emergency management, or more 
specifically, what emergency manager’s roles, authorities, and responsibilities are. It 
maintains a broad and all-encompassing perspective of the realm of emergency 
management. 
Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola reference a 2009 Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) (OIG-09-25) report and testimony given by Donald F. Kettl about whether FEMA 
should be in Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which states, “The well-
recognized cycle of emergency management includes preparedness, response, recovery, 
and mitigation.”42 This statement is an interesting promotion of the four phases of 
emergency management. However, the report then continues to critique notions of a two-
phase approach that would include crisis management and consequence management.43 It 
then cites a Hart-Rudd Commission Report that states that a distinction between crises 
management and consequence management as two separate efforts is neither sustainable 
nor wise, as it creates a duplicative command structure which creates confusion and 
delay.44 It finally states that if FEMA was removed from DHS, then DHS would lose 
preparedness and response capability.45 It is interesting that recovery and mitigation are 
not listed as key functions that might be lost.  
Perhaps one of the more intriguing excerpts of the OIG report is one in which the 
author cites an argument by Michael Chertoff (former Director of DHS) that: 
The core of the argument made about FEMA is that somehow FEMA’s 
involved with consequence management, dealing with the response, and 
DHS, in other respects, is dealing with preventing or protecting against a 
                                                 
41 Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, Introduction to Emergency Management. 
42 Office of Inspector General, FEMA: In or Out? (OIG-09-25) (Washington, DC: Department of 





response, and that if these are different functions, that therefore they ought 
to be under different roofs, and I really beg to differ with that. I think that 
is a profound misunderstanding of how one plans and prepares and 
executes in the face of a possible emergency.46 
Kettl further adds, “for local frontline first responders, there is no line between terrorist 
and nonterrorist hazards; first responders must focus on all-hazards-plus. The federal 
approach and structure should match the local approach. Separation would create deep 
fissures between national policy and the realities of local response.”47 This viewpoint 
seems to be flawed logic, however, since in every planning effort, various disciplines and 
organizations are always involved in representing various roles and responsibilities across 
all four phases of emergency management, and neither at the local level nor the federal 
level does it make sense to try and force all those disciplines, functions, organizations, 
etc., under the same departmental roof. Each organization, agency, entity, and discipline 
needs to think about how it prepares, responds, recovers, and mitigates within its distinct 
roles and responsibilities. 
In an article making the case for emergency management as a profession, David 
T. Crews states, “In their primary and ‘strategic’ roles, emergency managers must 
analyze the threat to economic and population centers; determine the significance of that 
threat, gauge the potential scope of the threat (size and impact); provide threat frequency 
and provide a course of action (emergency operations plan) for governing bodies.”48 He 
does not state how it is to be accomplished, or whether emergency managers facilitate 
this process through the collaboration of various disciplines or through an autonomous 
approach. In other words, he does not explain whether the emergency managers are the 
doers or the coordinators and facilitators. He goes on to state, “Emergency managers are 
also required to tactically respond in support of the Emergency Operations Plan when 
circumstances dictate. They are often in charge of Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 
                                                 
46 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins University, December 
3, 2008. As cited in: Office of Inspector General, FEMA: In or Out? (OIG-09-25) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-25_Feb09.pdf. 
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with critical information and communications resources during large disasters and 
catastrophes.”49 Crews makes an interesting distinction between the strategic 
responsibilities and the tactical responsibilities that are not seen in many documents. He 
does state that emergency managers are in charge of EOCs, which is interesting and 
could probably be debated in many local jurisdictions where emergency managers simply 
coordinate activities in EOCs and have little to no authority.  
In a 2007 empirical study on the changing roles and responsibilities of the local 
emergency manager, it is stated: 
Prior to 2002 emergency management staff spent the majority of their time 
on hazard preparedness projects but this time allocation shifted 
dramatically when a variety of federal homeland security grants became 
available to state and local governments. This shift in responsibilities may 
be a sign that domestic security concerns have supplanted the all-hazards 
approach to emergency management at the local level.50  
Of course, it further states, “it may also be a product of the manner in which federal 
homeland security grants are administered and the dynamics of the intergovernmental 
structure of emergency management in the U.S.”51 Whether or not the activities of the 
local emergency manager have shifted is not as important as the appropriateness of the 
actions in regards to what the roles and responsibilities should be. 
In the opening sentence of his article, “‘Crisis’ in the International Encyclopedia 
for Social Sciences,” James A. Robinson states, “‘Crisis’ is a lay term in search of a 
scholarly meaning.’”52 Patrick Lagadec, in his study, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis, 
Strategies for Prevention, Control and Damage Limitation, states, “the scholar must 
admit to the decision maker that he or she is struggling with the omnipresent yet 
ephemeral idea of crisis, a concept that seems more like a mirage than a scientific tool.”53 
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He goes on to describe that analysts too are in distress on the matter “because the 
concepts are so vague, there is no clearly stated theory.”54 Additionally, (according to 
Lagadec) Wolf-Dieter Eberwein of the University of Bielefeld in Germany has called for 
a more disciplined use of the term crisis stating, “Concept formation in theory 
construction is basic because we thus fix, with the necessary precision, the meaning of 
the terms we wish to designate the phenomena we want to explain.”55 
In Lagadec’s study, Preventing Chaos in a Crisis, Strategies for Prevention, 
Control and Damage Limitation, he states, “The issue of definitions probably creates the 
greatest discomfort in the face of the wealth of proposals.”56 He then outlines several 
definitions of crisis, most of which are organizational in nature, many of which are just 
symptom descriptions, and a couple sociological examples peppered in.57 In the end, 
Lagadec proposes three primary factors for crisis: the tidal wave (crisis = an emergency 
that overwhelms problem-solving resources), disruption (crisis = the system threatens to 
crumble), and breakdown (crisis = the familiar world threatens to collapse).58  
Lagadec’s description of crisis helps to define what events, issues, and 
characteristics crisis managers seek to address and manage. However, if all the elements 
of Lagadec’s definition must be met before something can be defined a crisis, then the 
definition begs the question, if the crisis can be managed, then is it in fact a crisis at all? 
Lagadec’s study also further stresses the difficulty in trying to define crisis and crisis 
management.  
Despite the gelatinous and somewhat ephemeral nature of defining the term and 
concept of crisis, several authors have concocted their own descriptions and definitions. 
One example from the book, Coping with Crisis: The Management of Disasters, Riots 
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and Terrorism, defines crisis as, “a serious threat to the basic structures of the 
fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly 
uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.”59 This definition is also the 
basis for the book, The Politics of Crisis Management by Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric 
Stern, and Bengt Sundelius.60 Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius consider three key 
components to the definition of crises: threat, uncertainty, and urgency.61 The book 
continues to present crisis management as a highly conceptual process of sense making 
and decision making during any number of events. They admit that their definition of 
crises is an “academic shortcut on the way to understanding crisis management,”62 and 
they claim to be “aware that the management of crisis may depend on the type of 
threat.”63 Additionally, they claim, “The Strategic—as opposed to the tactical or 
operational—challenges for leaders in dealing with various threats are essentially the 
same.”64 This claim relegates their definition of crisis management to the strategic realm 
and leaves people to wonder what the consistent operational and tactical methods of crisis 
management may be. 
In the book, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies, Arnold 
Howitt and Herman Leonard posit two types of emergencies exist, routine and novel.65 
According to the book, crisis management must be accomplished in novel emergencies.66 
They further detail the characteristics of and competencies necessary for managing novel 
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events and crises and the differences between the competencies and characteristics 
necessary for routine emergencies.67 They provide the following framework in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Emergency Response Mode Characteristics.68 
This framework certainly helps in crisis identification based on Howitt and 
Leonard’s definition of the term. However, this description, and the concepts in the book, 
are more conceptual and strategic in regards to sense making and novelty identification. It 
seems to be primarily a cautionary tale about inflexibility in the face of chaos, 
uncertainty, and novelty. This literature did not do any favors in identifying exactly who 
crisis or emergency managers are, as well as their respective authorities or roles and 
responsibilities. In the study, “Crisis Management Competencies: The Case of 
Emergency Managers in the USA,” Montgomery Van Wart and Naim Kapucu further 
elaborate on the difficulties in modern definitions of crisis and crisis management by 
stating:  
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Some confusion is induced in this area because of different preferences in 
nomenclature between the private and public sectors. In the private sector, 
the term crisis management is often used very broadly to mean the 
prevention and response to all untoward events—regardless of severity, 
scope, anticipation, and so on… This is now sometimes included in 
expanded definitions of risk management and business continuity 
strategies.69  
Van Wart and Kapucu, however, do a great job of bounding the domain of crisis 
management.70 They provide the following diagram in Figure 3 as examples of change as 
a function of scope and speed.  
 
Figure 3.  Change Event Characteristics and Types.71 
Through the above chart and elaboration Van Wart and Kapucu do a great job of 
identifying that not all sudden threats to organizational status quo are actually crises, nor 
do they all require crisis management. Their identification of relatively fast reactive or 
forced change with a limited scope being where crisis management occurs helps to apply 
crises management and crises managers to more traditional organizational structures. 
Another important distinction they make is that crisis management “is related, but not 
identical, to emergency management, change management, and transformational 
leadership.”72 They define crisis management as: 
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A special type of change management typified by surprise (or uncertainty 
in planning context) due to unexpectedness or size of an incident, short 
time frame, and criticality in terms of life-and-death consequences or 
organizational threat. Crisis refers to the organization being significantly 
damaged or being unable to respond coherently or effectively. When this 
occurs to an emergency management agency because of a very large 
event, it is usually called disaster or catastrophe management. While 
emergency management agencies rarely have sufficient resources to fully 
anticipate all catastrophes, good contingency planning as well as 
interagency exercises and coordination with political leaders can alleviate 
the severity of disasters enormously, or conversely if lacking, seem to 
make matters worse.73 
The findings of Van Wart and Kapucu’s study indicate that senior emergency 
managers in administrative leadership positions do not “abandon emergency management 
practices during crises, but rather adapt them selectively.”74 However, their definition of 
emergency managers and emergency management is somewhat muddled including a 
rather large category of practitioners and leaders. They define emergency management 
and disaster management synonymously as:  
Avoiding and dealing with risks. At its best, it prevents or minimizes 
emergencies, and then routinely handles emergencies with plans, training, 
and resources when they do happen. This field involves many areas in the 
public sector, notably public safety departments, emergency management, 
flood control, etc. Because timely response in incidents, emergencies and 
disasters is critical, the routinization of response through training and 
drills provides much needed efficiency. Part of risk and emergency 
management is the development of contingency plans for when the system 
malfunctions, or for unusual-but-possible scenarios, in particular 
catastrophes.75 
When comparing the two definitions, while Van Wart and Kapucu provide for 
crisis management and emergency management, a few interesting issues are presented. 
The first is that emergency managers are identified as being only one of several “areas” 
involved in emergency management.76 It states that emergency management “handles 
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emergencies with plans, training, and resources,”77 but then does not state which “area” 
does which. Also, the fact that it describes emergency and disaster management 
synonymously but then specifically states, “Crisis refers to the organization being 
significantly damaged or being unable to respond coherently or effectively. When this 
occurs to an emergency management agency because of a very large event, it is usually 
called disaster or catastrophe management.”78 This statement leads to the belief that 
disaster management is different from emergency management, or that emergency 
management transforms into disaster management when the traditional emergency 
management capabilities are not sufficient. Furthermore, earlier in the document, they 
state: 
In the public sector, in which a significant portion of the agencies, 
personnel, and resources are devoted to this purpose, untoward events that 
are planned for are called emergencies and disasters, and therefore the 
effort to plan and respond to untoward events – natural and manmade – is 
called emergency management. Crisis and catastrophes have a special 
meaning, suggesting that the system has been overwhelmed or taken off 
guard and outside resources and the concomitant external coordination are 
necessary for effective response and recovery.79  
Still, they had already said that when an emergency management structure is 
overwhelmed, it is called disaster management, not crisis management. This statement is 
not entirely accurate, however, since emergency management structures often activate to 
support emergency management structures in political sub-divisions that have been 
overwhelmed (counties supporting cities, for example). In other words, by Van Wart and 
Kapucu’s definitions and logic, one jurisdiction’s emergency might be a lower 
jurisdiction’s disaster. Furthermore, it describes disaster and emergency management 
synonymously but then states that disaster management is what happens when emergency 
management is overwhelmed.80 They cannot be synonymous if emergency management 
and crisis management are specifically identified as different, and the definition for crisis 
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management is when disaster management occurs. These definitions and descriptions 
also seem to go back and forth between inferences to a process, a system, or an 
organization of emergency management. 
While Van Wart and Kapucu “seek to clarify…distinct concepts that are related 
but often blurred,”81 it would seem they still leave some related concepts somewhat 
blurred. While they do highlight some key competency differences between emergency 
managers and crisis managers, they do little to define the specific roles, responsibilities, 
or authorities of these differing positions. They do provide great value in bounding the 
domain of crises management activities, as well as in demonstrating that crisis 
management is not solely the activity or realm of the public sector, but also necessary in 
the private sector.  
Christoph Roux-Dufort argues in his article, “Is Crisis Management (Only) a 
Management of Exceptions?,” that crisis management has heretofore limited itself to the 
analysis of exceptional situations, and in doing so, has isolated itself from mainstream 
organizational theory.82 He cautions that should the study of crises not “go beyond the 
sphere of exception management” that it will continue to “remain an isolated discipline 
with little room for innovation and progress.”83 The study proposes seeing crises as a 
process of incubation for organizational change and transformation through reevaluation 
of three suppositional factors: reassigning the triggering point, seeing crises as temporal 
events, thus removing common perceptions of and associations with urgency, and seeing 
a crisis as a surge of meaning as opposed to a collapse of meaning, as is the commonly 
held perspective.84 He blames the isolation of crisis management as a discipline on four 
primary factors: crisis being used as an alibi, crisis being poorly defined, crisis being 
affiliated entirely with accidents, and (somewhat in summary of the previous three) crisis 
                                                 
81 Van Wart and Naim Kapucu, “Crisis Management Competencies: The Case of Emergency 
Managers in the USA,” 508. 
82 Christophe Roux-Dufort, “Is Crisis Management (Only) a Management of Exceptions?,” Journal of 




becoming the science of the exceptional.85 He proposes a conceptual paradigm change 
away from seeing crisis as an event but instead to see it as a process.86 Perhaps most 
controversial, he proposes that through a processual perspective of crisis, individuals 
quickly see that victims of crisis are in fact culprits, simply speeding up a pre-existing 
dynamic.87 Furthermore, while praising the relevance of their work, he accuses Patrick 
Lagadec and Urial Rosenthal (referenced earlier in this literature review section) of 
substitution and semantic escalation by interchanging the terms rupture and 
inconceivability with crisis, thus “widening the distance between crises management and 
preoccupation of managers and organization theorists.”88  
Roux-Dufort provides a surprisingly counter-culture perspective on crisis and 
crisis management. It serves as an interesting exercise to see crisis as a process instead of 
an event. It demonstrates value in defining crisis and crisis management in such a way as 
to bring organizational theory and crisis theory in to greater harmony. More than 
anything, this article reinforces the fact that crisis and crisis management (and crisis 
managers more specifically) lack clear definition and specificity. 
Ultimately, the academic and practitioner literature, while all tremendous and 
relevant, only serves to muddy the waters in regards to the specific definition and 
delineation of the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of emergency managers, crisis 
managers, incident managers, incident responders, risk managers, business continuity 
specialists, and preparedness coordinators. All the literature reviewed, as well as many 
other sources reviewed and not included in this thesis, seem to confuse terms, use 
definitions interchangeably, obfuscate specificity, and purposely broaden domains and 
relevance. While many would seek to define competencies for professionals with these 
various titles, it seems premature without first defining the appropriate specific mission 
space, roles, responsibilities, and authorities for each. Furthermore, defining specifically 
what aspects of each of these are disciplines or professions seems to be unclear.  
                                                 





Regarding crisis and crisis management, the common preeminent perspectives 
seem to place the responsibility of crisis management on the person or organization that 
the crisis is happening to, like people in the middle of a psychological breakdown acting 
as their own therapist. This perspective seems like a foolhardy approach to define or 
operate as a crisis manager, and actually creates a bit of a paradox, as many definitions of 
crisis have elements describing them as unmanageable. It seems more appropriate to view 
crisis managers as an outside force who attempt to stabilize, marginalize, or isolate a 
crisis from the outside, especially if that external crisis stands as a threat to their own 
organization or capability.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS  
After reviewing the extent federal, state, and local doctrine, grants guidance, 
professional association guidance, accreditation and training institution guidance, and the 
academic and practitioner literature available on the topics of emergency management, 
crisis management, incident management, incident response, community preparedness, 
business continuity, and risk management, much is left unclear and in obfuscation. 
However, several findings and areas of needed definition and exploration were identified. 
The findings of this literature review fall into the following seven topics.  
• Much is written about what emergency management does, but little about 
what emergency management does not do. The term emergency 
management is often broadly used as a catch-all to define everything and 
everyone having anything to do with incident management, and these two 
terms are often used interchangeably. It is never clear if emergency 
management is part of incident management, or crisis management; nor is 
it clear if it is the other way around, or some other combination. 
Additionally, it seems to be of great confusion how much emergency 
management emergency managers specifically are responsible for, or have 
authority over. Once again, emergency managers are often identified as 
having great scope and responsibility, where other times, emergency 
managers seem to be left out of emergency management all together 
where emergency management is seen as a process effectively carried out 
by various disciplines and agencies without emergency manager 
involvement. Much clarity and domain bounding is needed in every 
category of this literature review.  
• The phases of emergency management seem to be under suppositional 
debate, if not overt debate. Whether there are two phases of emergency 
 40 
management (crisis management, consequence management), three phases 
(preparedness, response, recovery), four phases (preparedness, response, 
recovery, mitigation), five phases (prevention, preparedness, response, 
recovery, mitigation), or six phases (protection, prevention, preparedness, 
response, recovery, mitigation) seems to be under debate. While four 
phases seems to be the predominate list, several documents passively 
identify and presuppose or argue for each of the options previously listed. 
Definitive clarity and is needed in every category of the literature review. 
• Specific differences and delineation between the various roles, 
responsibilities, authorities, mission spaces, and jurisdictions of incident 
responders, incident managers, incident commanders, crisis managers, 
emergency managers, preparedness coordinators, risk managers, 
mitigation specialists, and business continuity specialists is not found 
uniformly or disparately in any of the documents in this literature review. 
• DOCs are not addressed well enough in the most common national 
incident management guiding doctrine, which may be inadvertently 
propagating a conceptual gap between tactical and support mechanisms 
and allowing for inappropriate mission creep during incident management 
operations. 
• Doctrine is lacking in outlining the differences between strategic, 
operational, and tactical incident management activities and what 
functions have the lead on which. 
• Appropriate KSAs are extremely difficult to define for the various 
emergency and crisis management variants due to the aforementioned 
findings, thus making effective performance metrics, training, and 
education very difficult to establish in the realm of incident management. 
• The current incident management doctrine and foundational guidance is 
composed of not one but various doctrinal sources, created by various 
disparate entities and agencies seemingly not in complete cooperation, 
with different paradigm influences, with disjointed or conflicting 
language, without a clearly stated comprehensive unifying guiding set of 
principles for doctrine creation, and is not comprehensive as it does not 
seem to address all the potential aspects, concepts, or topics of the incident 
management enterprise or activities.  
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IV. PROPOSED INCIDENT MANAGEMENT CONCEPTUAL 
MODEL 
Not until terms and concepts have been clearly defined can one hope to 
make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and 
expect the reader to share one’s views.89 
 
To better understand incident management and where individuals fit within the 
incident management enterprise, it is necessary to define the various components of 
incident management, and describe the various interrelated parts, players, places, and 
concepts that make up incident management, its process, and the enterprise at large. 
Additionally, when endeavoring to discern incident management intuitively and 
comprehensively, it is perhaps most advisable to establish a set of guiding higher order 
incident management truths, or principles, as a foundation or springboard to be applied 
comprehensively to the entire model. After conducting the in-depth literature review and 
analysis, and practitioner interviews, it became apparent that a consistent set of higher 
order incident management principles, or truths, were not applied consistently or 
comprehensively in the existing, seemingly disparate, foundational sources of incident 
management doctrine. The literature review and practitioner interviews, when reviewed 
by the author of this study, brought to light a number of areas or categories that should be 
addressed for an incident management model to be consistent and comprehensive, and 
maintain maximum utility for the practitioner. The following short list of guiding 
principles, or truths, informs the various components and aspects of a newly proposed 
comprehensive incident management conceptual model: 
• A model should be designed with maximum capacity, ideal resources, and 
ideal practitioner competency in mind. A model should serve as a 
benchmark, standard, and goal, and as such, should be designed to be the 
ideal end product. 
• Universal application should be the cornerstone of an incident 
management model. To ensure maximum adoption, consistent 
familiarization, consistent integration and application, and consistent 
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paradigm framing, the model should be developed with consistency and 
universality from the lowest to the highest levels. 
• Clearly bounded mission spaces, roles, responsibilities, and authorities 
need to be defined to reduce application friction, mission creep, and 
implementation conflict. 
• The model should remain as simple as possible and avoid cumbersome 
structures and options to ensure the feasibility of implementation and 
consistency of adoption amongst all practitioners. 
• The model should avoid esoteric concepts and should focus on 
pragmatism, intuitiveness, and overall simplicity. 
• The model should be modular and component driven so that elements can 
be added or removed where necessary and unnecessary or redundant 
aspects are reduced or eliminated in the interest of efficiency and efficacy. 
• Incidents are managed at the lowest possible level and all incident 
management components serve to return things to their lowest possible 
levels. 
• A comprehensive incident management model defines and describes the 
event types, the practitioners, the processes, the activities, the 
competencies, the mission spaces, and the organizational structures 
inherent to effective incident management. 
• The components of the model should be described and their purpose and 
logic justified ensuring the practitioner has an understanding not just of 
the “what,” but also of the “why.”  
• To ensure maximum conceptual saturation, the incident management 
model should contain visual diagrams to assist the practitioner in concept 
comprehension to help ensure consistent application and understanding of 
the model across the entire incident management enterprise.  
The following topics present a new, more holistic, pragmatic conceptual 
framework and model for understanding and defining the relationships and concepts of 
the major incident management components applying the higher order incident 
management principles previously described. This conceptual model is designed to be a 
linear inductive Socratic exploration where topics are introduced and broadly discussed, 
then the individual components of that topic are given a proposed definition, and a 
justification for the definition is provided. Each topic is a layer building upon the 
understanding and logic of the last. Amongst the layers of topics are a number of 
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graphical models that help the reader conceptualize and understand the topics. At the end, 
once all the necessary topics have been explored, a number of fictional examples are 
provided to illustrate the implementation of this model followed by several real-world 
case examples.  
A. STIMULUS EVENT TYPES 
As presented in Figure 4, the stimulus event types discussed are catastrophe, 
disaster, emergency, state-of-emergency, incident, crisis, threat, and specific active threat.  
 
This figure is a conceptual diagram of the various incident management event and 
stimulus types. It applies to the entire stimulus event type section. Notice specifically 
where events overlap, and their relation to the moment an incident takes place. An 
incident occurring does not always dictate or preclude or exclude the concurrent 
existence of another particular state of being, stimulus type, or event classification.  
Figure 4.  Incident Management Event Types 
Introduction: It can be extremely difficult to discern between the aforementioned 
terms if looking to existing doctrine and literature. As an example, The National 
Preparedness Goal states: 
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Communities regularly deal with emergencies and disasters that have 
fewer impacts than those considered to be the greatest risk to the Nation. 
In addition, communities may have resident capacities to deal with the 
public’s needs locally for many of these lesser incidents. Catastrophic 
incidents will require a much broader set of atypical partners to 
accomplish the capability targets for the Response core capabilities than 
those routinely addressed.90  
This document never states what differentiates a disaster or emergency from a “lesser 
incident” or a “catastrophic incident.” Furthermore, differences occur between 
proclaimed local emergencies, proclaimed states of emergency, and declared disasters.91 
These incidents are each tied to levels of political subdivision and financial 
reimbursement eligibility. Meanwhile, the definition of a crisis is a major topic of 
academic debate that has very little specific meaning or definition in current incident 
management doctrine. Crisis and threat are often loosely affiliated with law enforcement 
and security activities in most incident management doctrine. 
As demonstrated in the literature review and analysis, various inconsistent and 
interchangeable uses of the aforementioned terms exist. This persistent trend may cause 
confusion regarding thresholds of various incident management activities amongst 
various disciplines and practitioners. While these terms are fairly relative when used 
colloquially or figuratively, in relation to incident management, it is an area that needs 
term definition and consistency. 
The following definitions are proposed.  
1. Catastrophe 
Catastrophes are a series of cascading human-caused events or incidents, the 
adverse effects or consequences of which are potentially, seemingly, or definitively 
irreversible. A catastrophe may be caused by a disaster, or may be the cause of a disaster. 
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A catastrophe may be an emergency or cause a state of emergency, or, an emergency or 
state of emergency may cause a catastrophe.  
Justification: The radiological release and contamination of an area due to a 
tsunami or earthquake exceeding the safety design parameters, coupled with ineffective 
redundancy measures, might be an example of a catastrophe caused by a disaster. Run 
away greenhouse effects caused by human influence creating rising sea levels, increased 
hurricanes, or severe coastal flooding might be an example of a catastrophe causing 
disasters. An oil spill in a local area caused by a series of safety failures responded to 
with local resources that adversely significantly alter a local eco-system causing the 
extinction of a species of animal or plant might be an example of a catastrophe, which is 
an incident but not an emergency (as local resources were not overwhelmed). A massive 
oil spill causing significant environmental harm, destruction, death, or extinction that 
overwhelms local response agencies and assets requiring outside emergency response 
resources might be an example of a catastrophe causing an emergency or state of 
emergency. Catastrophes may also be caused by or cause crises. The primary component 
of a catastrophe is a series of events or incidents with irreversible adverse effects that are 
human caused or that could have been mitigated by human actions and were not, or that 
exceeded several levels of human design or engineering factors. Catastrophes may be 
environmental, economic, technological, etc.  
2. Disaster 
A disaster is any natural event or emergency, or (regardless of cause) any fire, 
flood, or explosion that warrants major federal or international assistance.  
Justification: The primary component of a disaster is its inherent requirement for 
federal level (or international) assistance. This aspect denotes a level of severity 
appropriate for the title. Disasters are often devastating (financially, environmentally, or 
mortally) not just to the local area of impact, but potentially also to the state, nation, or 
nations. When these events occur, they carry a level of seriousness that should only be 
titled appropriately as a disaster.  
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3. Emergency 
An emergency is an incident or crisis posing a threat to the safety of persons, 
property, or the environment that exceeds an organization’s resources or capability.  
Justification: The primary component of an emergency is its overwhelming 
nature. By the very nature of the word “emergency,” it becomes non-routine. The simple 
existence of an incident or crisis does not inherently denote an emergency; many 
incidents or crises could be considered routine. For example, a car accident or structure 
fire in a jurisdiction is an incident that does not likely overwhelm local resources or 
capabilities and could be considered routine. Equally, a crisis like a labor strike or non-
crisis event like changing economic factors that threaten the local tax base and affect 
long-term organizational change do not necessarily overwhelm local resources or denote 
an emergency or state of emergency. An emergency results when local resources are not 
adequate to respond to life safety, property damage, or environmental damage issues.  
4. State of Emergency 
A state of emergency is an eminent impending incident or crisis posing a threat to 
the safety of persons, property, or the environment likely to exceed resources or 
capability of the proclaiming political jurisdiction, or, the existence of an active incident 
that threatens a population and the adequacy of local resources is unknown.  
Justification: A state of emergency may exist when it is known that an 
impending threat will definitely overwhelm local resources or capabilities, or, if it is 
unknown whether local resources are enough to manage an existing incident. For 
example, if a wildfire is threatening a local population and it is unclear whether the 
resources that have been applied to the wildfire response are enough to contain it, then a 
state of emergency may be in effect for that local population. Or, if an active shooter 
event is occurring and it is unknown how many malicious actors are involved or the 
scope of their capabilities, and it is unknown if local response resources will be adequate 
to stop the threat, then a state of emergency may be in effect. 
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5. Incident 
An incident is the physical manifestation of a crisis, event, or occurrence that has 
adversely affected life, property, or the environment requiring the response of at least one 
individual.  
Justification: An incident may be a relatively small or routine event, as small as a 
person cutting a finger, or as large as the crash of the Titanic. One or several incidents 
may be involved in an emergency, disaster, or catastrophe. The boundaries of an incident 
can be recognized by the directly correlated and active negative impacts or consequences 
related to an event at a general location that are addressed in a coordinated manner on-
scene.  
6. Crisis 
A crisis is a phenomenon, event, active threat, or trend, with or without a specific 
location posing seemingly inevitable harm to life, property, environment, organizational 
performance, reputation, or way of life reasonably or ethically necessitating a deliberate 
urgent intervention. (A crisis may be local, national, or global) 
Justification: Perhaps the most controversial and difficult definition, a crisis is 
described by many definitions. Unfortunately none are very satisfying in relation to 
incident management (see literature review). Little consensus has been reached for what a 
crisis means specifically. It seems that if an incident has not yet occurred, but a known 
imminent future incident or potential incident, preventable incident caused by persistent 
or systemic conditions, or threat to an organizational structure, state of seemingly 
harmonious stability, necessary symbiotic dependency, or cultural paradigm presents 
itself, then the knowledge of the threat or hazard’s existence and its consequences is the 
crisis or state of crisis, or an exigency (threatening operation, reputation, or existence) 
requiring urgent organizational attention. This definition alludes to moral or value 
imperative, for better or worse, but could also describe operational, economic, or other 
types of imperative responses.  
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7. Threat 
A threat is a communicated, demonstrated, or inferred intent and potential 
capability to harm life, property, environment, organizational performance, or way of life.  
Justification: Threat denotes intent, and thus, is inherently related to human 
factors. The general state of being under threat from an actor or actors simply denotes the 
existence of malicious intent with potential capability and generally communicated 
targets without knowledge of an active attempt to execute.  
8. Specific Active Threat 
A specific active threat is a known communicated, demonstrated, or inferred 
timely intent and capability to harm life, property, environment, organizational 
performance, or way of life with a specified or unspecified target.  
Justification: Threat denotes intent, and thus, is inherently related to human 
factors. When intelligence indicates actors that currently possess malicious intent to cause 
damage, harm, or disruption to something that they feasibly have access to, in fact, have 
the capabilities or tools to act on that threat, then specific active protective and 
preventative measures must be taken. This threat is different from a non-specific or a 
non-active threat that is the general state of being under threat from an actor or actors 
with no specifically communicated target or unknown capabilities.  
B. PRACTITIONERS 
Practitioners include emergency responders, crisis responders, incident 
responders, incident commanders, incident managers, crisis managers, crisis leaders, 
emergency managers, emergency management functional representatives, risk managers, 
disaster coordinators, emergency planners, preparedness specialists, and business 
continuity specialists, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. These figures are conceptual diagrams 
of the various incident management practitioner types and apply to the entire practitioner 
section, but are also used in later sections to illustrate other incident management 
components. Notice specifically the delineation between tactical, operational, and 
strategic mission focuses amongst the varying mission areas, and the applicable 
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practitioners. Additionally, notice the delineation between command and direction in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Incident Management Levels. 
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Figure 6.  Incident Management Knowledge, Skills and Abilities. 
Introduction: Within the extent incident management literature, as demonstrated 
within the literature review, inconsistency occurs in the definitions, roles and 
responsibilities, and general descriptions of the various incident management 
practitioners or actors necessary for effective comprehensive incident management. 
Exploring and delineating key aspects amongst these various actors is key in 
understanding how someone fits in to the sometimes complex and dynamic incident 
management universe and structure. It also helps to establish a metric and expectation for 
success and performance. It would be foolhardy and inappropriate, as well as unfair to 
expect any one actor or practitioner to try and fulfill all or even several of the various 
incident management roles during a large complex incident. Furthermore, without clearly 
defined expectations, it can be very difficult to determine how successful someone is. It 
also helps to ensure that unnecessarily redundant, conflicting, and overlapping activities 
are not occurring, or being expected by outside stakeholders. It also helps to reduce 
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mission-creep amongst the various disciplines and practitioners within the incident 
management spectrum of actors. This is not to say, even after a definition has been 
created, that practitioners never fill more than one role. A person may be acting as an 
emergency manager one day and as a crisis manager the next depending on needs, 
qualifications, and clearly defined expectations. The following section discusses all the 
conceivably differing primary incident management practitioner types, their roles and 
responsibilities, and how they fit in to the incident management universe.  
The following definitions are proposed.  
1. Emergency Responder 
An emergency may be any individuals who, in their regular course and scope of 
duties, may be dispatched to the scene of an incident to address imminent life safety 
issues. 
Justification: This definition is particularly difficult, as the term “responder” is 
often solely associated with sworn and badged public safety personnel. This proposed 
definition addresses life safety specifically because if it were to incorporate life, property, 
environment, and the economy then, taken literally, any plumber responding to a call for 
service for a residential water leak, which is a small incident in its own right, would be 
considered an emergency responder. That definition would be too broad and unsatisfying. 
However, the proposed definition would include anyone, sworn or unsworn, badged or 
non-badged, dispatched to the scene of an incident to address immediate life safety 
issues.  
2. Crisis Responder 
Crisis responders may be any individuals who, in their regular course and scope 
of duties, may be dispatched to the field prior to an impending or imminent incident to 
ensure life safety or prevent, protect, or mitigate property, environment, or economic 
issues. 
Justification: This definition is perhaps the least explored “responder” one due to 
the nebulous and broad use of the term “crisis” in the extent incident management 
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literature. The proposed definition encompasses all personnel dispatched in the field to 
address issues that may arise due to a known impending event or threat. (See also the 
definition of “crisis” in the “event types” section of this proposed lexicon) Examples 
would be law enforcement officers dispatched to the scene of a potential crime to prevent 
people with malicious intent from executing their plans, or to protect a known or 
suspected target from being exposed. It also applies to utility workers shutting off, 
hardening, or protecting infrastructure prior to an impending storm or other known event 
that poses a threat to life, property, environment, or economy. It also may apply to 
anyone prepositioning assets or supplies prior to a known impending event.  
3. Incident Responder 
Incident responders may be any individuals who, in their regular course and scope 
of duties, may be dispatched to the scene of an incident to address potential life safety 
issues, or prevent, protect, or mitigate life safety, property, environment, or economic 
issues. 
Justification: This definition encompasses everyone in the incident management 
spectrum dispatched to the field. It includes sworn and unsworn, badged and non-badged, 
and all other response personnel in the field. Incident response is the umbrella that 
captures both emergency, crisis, and support personnel in the field in response to an 
incident that has occurred.  
4. Incident Commander 
An incident commander is the person responsible for all aspects of incident 
response at the scene of an incident, which includes the development of incident 
objectives, the management of incident operations, the application of resources, and the 
responsibility for the safety and actions of all persons involved. 
Justification: The key to this definition is “at the scene.” If an individual is not at 
the incident command post and not directing the responders on the scene then that person 
is not the incident commander. Being on the scene is inherent to the incident commander 
as that individual is responsible for the safety and actions of those in the field, which 
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cannot be adequately accomplished from a remote location. (Exceptions may be 
considered when the application of technology allowing personnel to direct real-time 
tactical field response from a distance is utilized. More research should be done on this 
topic.) Additionally, it should be noted that an incident commander’s control mechanism 
is “command,” primarily due to the life safety and tactical responsibilities inherent to the 
position.  
5. Incident Manager 
Incident managers are any individual who, in their regular course and scope of 
duties, are responsible for managing an incident through command activities, dispatch 
activities, or support activities. They are also responsible during all three phases of the 
incident management process.  
Justification: The incident management universe is composed of practitioners in 
various disciplines who all have some pivotal role in incident management; some during 
all types of incidents, and others during specific types of incidents. However, simply 
participating in one phase of the incident management process (preparedness, incident 
response, and consequence management) does not make a practitioner an incident 
manager. For example, just because a practitioner teaches preparedness courses to local 
CERT teams, or does technical analyst or consulting work on a mitigation plan, or runs a 
local assistance center during the consequence management phase, does not mean that 
said practitioner is an incident manager. However, those functional or subject matter 
experts do have key roles and should not be discounted.  
6. Crisis Manager 
Crisis managers are any people who, in their regular course and scope of duties, 
are responsible for managing a specific incident response or incident support department, 
function, or discipline, who have direct authority and operational control or direction over 
incident response or support assets or personnel that address imminent life safety issues, 
or prevent, protect, or mitigate property, environment, or economic issues, whose actions 
may include quickly developing functional, organizational objectives, managing all 
dispatch and functional operations outside of the incident scene, the prioritization of 
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resources to various incidents or threats, as well as being responsible for the posturing of 
assets and of all persons in that function or discipline outside of the scene and not 
otherwise under the incident commander’s purview. These peoples’ control mechanism is 
directive in nature since they have the organizational and positional authority to direct 
agency and organizational resources, but the tactical and life safety issues do not require 
a command style control mechanism; it is asset posture oriented. 
Justification: Assets have to get to the scene before the incident commander 
takes authority over them. Also, assets must be brokered amongst various incidents. 
Additionally, if an incident has not yet occurred, but a known future incident, preventable 
incident, potentially imminent incident, or threat is present, someone has to manage the 
objectives, resources, and tactics for the various functions or disciplines involved in the 
response to these potential crises (See also the definition of “crisis” in the “event types” 
section of this proposed lexicon). Lastly, support resources must be mobilized to manage 
activities outside of the scene. These activities are examples for which crisis managers 
are responsible. These examples of crisis managers might include people working in 
DOCs managing the deployment of additional ambulances or fire engines to the incident, 
shelter managers to various shelters, heavy equipment to debris basins prior to a large 
storm, law enforcement officers to potential additional targets after a terrorist attack, or 
vaccination supplies in preparation for a spreading pandemic. Crisis managers may also 
work in dispatch centers, emergency operations centers, or area command posts.  
7. Crisis Leader 
A crisis leader is any senior executive or elected official responsible for to 
providing organizational leadership through representation, messaging, advocacy 
mobilization, fund raising, law creation, or other similar role internal or external to the 
organization during times of incidents or larger events, where those actions mitigate 
potential or imminent negative ramifications on the organization, the organization’s 
reputation, or the organization’s incident management efforts caused by unmitigated 
negative stakeholder sentiment or perception. 
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Justification: During disasters, it is common to have the organization come under 
significant public or stakeholder scrutiny. That scrutiny, unchallenged, addressed, or 
answered may cause long-term harm to the credibility of the larger organization. It may 
also create unnecessary friction or difficulty for the various incident management 
practitioners involved (for example, angry citizens rioting and harming emergency 
responders, where strong crisis leadership might have limited, reduced, or eliminated the 
number of rioters). Strong effective crisis leadership can only serve to support and 
improve the efficacy of the entire incident management structure, and is thusly, a key 
component of effective incident management. They are given the term “crisis” in the title 
because they are mitigating additional incidents or impacts to the organization that have 
yet to occur. Furthermore, an incident may not necessarily threaten the parent 
organization, but the stakeholder sentiment may specifically threaten the organization at 
large, and crisis leadership is specifically addressing that threat; thus, the term “crisis.” It 
should be noted that a crisis leader’s control mechanism is primarily policy setting and 
political in nature. Crisis leaders are often senior level executives and elected officials.  
8. Emergency Manager 
Emergency managers are individuals with expertise in the implementation of the 
necessary communication and operational framework necessary for effective strategic 
collaboration of senior level subject matter experts who represent various incident 
management functions or disciplines during all phases of incident management towards 
the goal of successful disaster support coordination. 
Justification: During the incident response phase, the actions and activities that 
take place at the scene of the incident are classified as tactical incident command. The 
actions that occur in functional DOCs are classified as operational crisis management. 
The actions that take place at the Emergency Management Center (EMC) are classified as 
strategic disaster support coordination. Those with multi-discipline collaboration 
responsibility at the scene of the incident are considered incident commanders and are 
part of the incident command system. Crisis managers in DOCs direct the operational 
support to the incident of single or related functions or disciplines. EMCs are the location 
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where high-level officials and subject matter experts from a vast array of functions 
collaborate strategically, and are the mechanism by which emergency managers facilitate 
successful disaster support coordination. During the consequence management phase, 
emergency managers are responsible for facilitating the collaboration between the various 
high-level officials and subject matter experts representing the various recovery 
functions, while crisis managers and incident commanders are more focused on 
demobilization and deactivation. During the preparedness phase, incident command 
practitioners focus on increasing their functional response capability, crisis managers 
focus on their function-specific operational preparedness and capacity, and emergency 
managers focus on collaborative multi-function or discipline planning and preparedness. 
Incident command practitioners focus on function specific competencies, crisis 
management practitioners focus on function specific and coordination (within their 
function) and analysis competencies, and emergency managers focus not on function or 
discipline specific knowledge, skills, and abilities, but instead on coordination skills, and 
the KSAs specifically associated with the collaborative incident management disaster 
support coordination communication and operations frameworks. An emergency 
manager’s control mechanism is coordination since emergency managers are not often 
granted authority over the staff and resources in the EMC. They control through positive 
coercion.  
9. Emergency Management Functional Representative 
Emergency management functional representatives are individuals possessing 
senior level expertise and authority in a single incident management function or 
discipline assigned to the EMC to represent their discipline, function, and department in 
collaborative strategic coordination and support activities.  
Justification: An EMC is only as successful as the practitioners who represent 
the various functions needed to be collaboratively coordinated. Just as a conductor and no 
musicians would make a poor orchestra, an emergency manager with no emergency 
management functional representatives would make a poor EMC. Emergency managers 
simply apply a collaboration, communication, and coordination framework to the various 
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disparate functions and disciplines represented in an EMC. Emergency management 
functional representatives can best be described as the gears in the EMC machine, where 
emergency managers are the grease in the gears that allows them to function smoothly 
without friction.  
10. Risk Manager 
A risk manager is an individual within a single discipline or function or larger 
conglomerate organization who, during the preparedness phase of incident management, 
determines the acceptable level of risk based on the gap between preparedness and 
vulnerabilities, as determined by hazard, threat, and capability assessments. 
Justification: If an organization is large enough, or rich enough in resources, it 
might have specifically designated risk managers whose sole responsibility is to 
determine an acceptable level of risk, and make adjustments or recommend adjustments 
accordingly. These practitioners probably should not be considered incident management 
practitioners, as their responsibilities are limited to the preparedness phase of incident 
management.  
11. Disaster Coordinator 
A disaster coordinator is an individual who organizes disparate organizations into 
disaster support functions or disaster support services (i.e., spontaneous volunteer center 
coordinators, family assistance center coordinators, community emergency response team 
dispatch center, etc.) 
Justification: Those with organizational skills, who understand the foundational 
incident management components, and have a working relationship with community 
members and community organizations, are often pivotal during major disasters as a 
mobilizing force and magnet for the community’s varying invaluable resources.  
12. Emergency Planner: (Profession/Discipline Sub-classification) 
An emergency planner is an individual within any incident management 
profession or discipline responsible for facilitating, creating, and reviewing incident 
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management related plans, policies, annexes, etc. prior to an incident or event, and who 
during an event, assists in the creation of action plans. These planners may assist in or 
facilitate consequence management recovery planning depending on their respective 
profession or discipline. 
Justification: Incident management or emergency response plans often cover the 
collaborative or disparate roles, responsibilities, and actions of various incident 
management professions, disciplines, and stakeholders and require the contribution, 
input, insight, and expertise of experienced craftsmen practitioners who also understand 
foundational planning processes (ideally as outlined in FEMA’s Comprehensive Planning 
Guidance CPG-101). Additionally, during the incident response phase, incident managers 
at all levels often participate in the action planning process to establish operational period 
incident management objectives and operational tempo. During the consequence 
management phase, recovery plans are often needed, and experienced planners can help 
shape and facilitate those plans by organizing organizations and disciplines for those who 
may not often participate in emergency planning or incident management planning.  
13. Preparedness Specialist 
A preparedness specialist is any person responsible for promoting, teaching, or 
ensuring individual disaster preparedness and resilience. This person generally has no 
incident response or recovery responsibilities.  
Justification: Preparedness specialists generally have no operational authority or 
responsibility during an incident. If a preparedness specialist has been successful, then 
individuals will be better positioned to withstand the adverse effects of an incident, 
whether those effects are financial, physical, emotional, organizational, etc.  
14. Business Continuity Specialist 
A business continuity specialist is any individual with expertise in ensuring 
sustainability and minimal-to-no disruption of service delivery, product development, or 
mission continuation broadly or specifically related to a business sector, profession, 
discipline, or department.  
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Justification: When the operating environment conditions (temporarily or 
permanently) adversely change for a business (or organization) making it difficult to meet 
operational obligations or expectations, an organization must be able to be flexible or 
resilient enough to weather the new conditions long enough to either allow the conditions 
to return to normal or the business or organization to adapt their business and service 
model to thrive within the new operating environment. Business continuity specialists 
focus on ensuring organizations are best positioned and prepared to withstand changing 
operating environments and are the equivalent of preparedness specialists for 
organizations as opposed to individuals. 
C. ORGANIZATIONS 
As presented in Figures 7 and 8, the organizations discussed are emergency 
operations centers, department operations center, dispatch centers, command posts, and 
on-scene. 
 
This figure is a conceptual diagram of the various incident management levels, the 
practitioners at each of those levels, the mission focuses of each incident management 
level, and other key incident management level characteristics. This figure applies to the 
entire organizations section, but is also used in other sections.  
Figure 7.  Incident Management Levels. 
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These figures are conceptual diagrams of the various incident management modular 
components that might be utilized during a large complex event. These figures apply to 
the entire organizations section. Notice specifically the universal common applicability of 
the model to all levels of government, and the potential for all those organizational 
components to activate a supplemental Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MACG) 
should the need arise. 
Figure 8.  Potential Incident Management Layers and Incident Management 
Layers and MACGs. 
Introduction: Within the extent incident management literature, as demonstrated 
within the literature review, several areas of activity, organizational structures, and 
command and control organizations are described. Within the literature, some of these 
organizations receive more attention and greater definition, description, and clarity than 
others. For some, the roles and responsibilities are somewhat vague or ill-defined; for 
others, their purpose seems to be redundant, and others are described within limited 
context. Understanding what organizations are carrying out which incident management 
activities helps to understand how the entirety of the incident management universe, what 
organizational components are necessary for effective incident management, what 
activities are carried out by which practitioners and at what level, and appropriate areas 
of focus depending on an area of operation. It would be difficult and potentially 
disastrous to expect the same incident management organization to manage the tactics, 
operations, strategies, policies, and politics of various simultaneous dynamic incidents, 
crises, emergencies, disasters, or catastrophes. A division of labor and a division of focus, 
responsibility, and expectation should be delineated amongst the various incident 
management organizations.  
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The following definitions are proposed.  
1. Emergency Management Center  
Emergency management takes place at an EMC. It is a multi-function 
coordination center where representatives from various disciplines and functions 
strategically coordinate using a common language, planning method, and organizational 
structure applied by emergency managers. The EMC supports the DOCs and the incident 
command post (ICP) and ensures continuity and survivability of its parent organization. 
EMCs have very little if no direct command and control over field assets.  
Justification: Currently, traditionally known as EOCs, EMCs are the hub of an 
organization’s cross-functional multi-discipline strategic coordination in preparation for 
and response to large dynamic incidents and events with a focus on response, recovery, 
and organizational continuity of service. If an EMC is activated prior to a known 
impending incident or event (i.e., hurricane or large planned event) then the EMC’s focus 
is on crisis management support and situational awareness. It should be noted that when 
engaged in crisis management support activities, an EMC’s focus is not on protection or 
prevention; it is focused on damage mitigation, preparedness, situational awareness, 
strategic policy evaluation, and business continuity. EMCs do not prevent hurricanes, 
tornadoes, earthquakes, terrorists, cyber attacks, etc. Operational DOCs from specific 
functions or departments with control over response assets (law enforcement, fire, public 
health, etc.) are responsible for the execution of prevention and protection activities. Prior 
to an incident or event during the crisis management activities, EMCs focus on reducing 
and mitigating the potential damage from impending or imminent threats and incidents, 
and implementing measures that might expedite the recovery process. The name EMC is 
more appropriate than EOC because EMCs do not actually direct field operations or have 
control over field assets, so the term “operations” makes little sense and only serves to 
create potential confusion about roles and responsibilities and may potentially create 
mission creep.  
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2. Department Operations Center  
Operational crisis management occurs at a DOC. It is a single department, 
discipline, or function’s operations center where crisis managers and technicians 
operationally manage, deploy, or dispatch assets, resources, or personnel to incidents and 
other field locations to support tactical activities. DOCs are the primary conduit between 
EMC strategy and coordination and field tactical activities.  
Justification: Those with operational knowledge and expertise within a specific 
function (law, fire, public health, public works, etc.) who are empowered to make 
decisions about operational prioritization of department or function assets in relation to 
various incidents work out of operations centers that serve as the hub for incoming field 
intelligence, information, communications, and dispatch of additional assets. From the 
department operations center, the strategies developed at the EMC are implemented or 
executed, and intelligence or requests from the field are vetted, verified, and distilled and 
then shared with the EMC for strategy development and collaborative situational 
awareness. The operational control of function specific assets may serve in a prevention, 
protection, mitigation, preparedness, response, or recovery role. Department operations 
centers may activate prior to or without an EMC activation for function specific incidents 
or for function specific threats to posture assets and prioritize threats and intelligence as 
necessary.  
3. Multi-Agency Coordination Group  
A MACG is a supplemental incident management issue or problem set driven 
component composed of relevant technical specialists from appropriate agencies or 
functions activated by and beholden to any organization layer of the incident 
management structure to address a complex issue that might otherwise consume, slow 
down, or hinder the parent incident management organization’s operational tempo or 
processes.  
Justification: The multi-agency coordination system (MACS) is one of the more 
difficult issues to address or discern among existing incident management components. 
As demonstrated in the literature review and analysis portion of this study, the extent 
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literature does not often clearly delineate between the roles and responsibilities of the 
MACS and other incident management component organizations, such as EOCs. If it can 
be agreed upon that the other identified organizations make up a comprehensive incident 
management structure, then it is perhaps best to view the multi-agency coordination 
concept as a supplemental concept best utilized to enhance or supplement existing 
structures. With this understanding in mind, it makes sense then to consider a group of 
specialists (from potentially varying and disparate organizations, agencies, disciplines, 
etc.) assigned to solve a particular problem set a MACG activated and assigned to a 
parent incident management organization, such as an EMC or DOC. The effective 
operations or activities of an ICP, DOC, or EMC depend upon an established tempo and 
planning cycle. Often, a difficult problem (such as resource scarcity or incident 
prioritization) can slow down the tempo or hinder the larger objective setting cycle of an 
EMC or DOC. Thus, it is best recommended to create a MACG to address that issue 
specifically outside of the general activities and tempo of that organization so that general 
progress can continue to be made.  
4. Incident Command Post  
The ICP is the location on scene from which all on-scene command, control, 
incident planning, and tactical operations are directed by the incident commander through 
the chain of command as outlined in the incident command system (ICS). 
Justification: The ICP is a foundational element of the ICS. It ensures that the 
span of control, responsibility, resource allocation, planning by objectives, and on-scene 
safety are all accomplished. 
5. Incident Management Team  
An incident management team (IMT) is a team deployed to support and consult 
for the full spectrum of incident management needs from preparedness, to incident 
response, to consequence management. An IMT may also be deployed as the primary 
response agency to an event of national significance in a non-domestic territory or 
location. 
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Justification: IMTs rarely supplant, replace, or override local incident command. 
They are not given the authority to do so unless a delegation of authority is authorized by 
the local organization (in home rule states). IMTs are generally deployed to assist local 
governments and local emergency response agencies with the management aspects of 
large, complex, or dynamic incidents, or multiple incidents. In non-domestic non-Stafford 
Act incidents where local government does not necessarily have jurisdictional authority, 
IMTs may be deployed as the primary response agency.  
6. Incident Command Support Team  
An incident command support team (ICST) is a team of trained incident command 
experts deployed to support and consult for incident commanders of dynamic incidents 
where additional support and expertise is necessary. 
Justification: ICST is the proposed term and definition for teams deployed to 
support field level response agencies solely, and not an EOC or emergency management 
function. Currently, IMT is the term used to signify support for both field and support 
level operations and delineation is rarely made between qualification, capability, or 
purpose. This term will more clearly define what the deployed or inbound support team’s 
purpose is, and what their qualifications and capabilities are. 
7. Emergency Management Assistance Team  
An emergency management assistance team (EMAT) is a team of trained 
emergency management, continuity of government or business continuity, and 
consequence management experts deployed to support and consult for EOC and recovery 
operations.  
Justification: It is the proposed term and definition for teams deployed to support 
EOC operations solely, and not field level operations. Often, when IMTs are deployed to 
incidents, they have an ICS and field-centric focus, and inappropriately apply tactical 
strategies to support and coordination EOC operations. Knowing whether the deployed 
team is qualified and credentialed for EOC support and coordination operations, as 
opposed to field level ICS operations, is key to legitimacy and appropriateness in an EOC 
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setting. As emergency management becomes more defined as a discipline, and as 
credentials and qualifications for support and coordination operations within an EOC 
become more defined, it will become more necessary to delineate between tactical field 
versus support and coordination competencies, capabilities, and qualifications. 
D. PHASES 
As presented in Figure 9, the phases discussed are preparedness, incident 
response, and consequence management. 
 
This figure is a conceptual diagram of the process of incident management over time, and 
the components therein. It applies to the entire phases section (similar graphs apply to the 
sense making characteristics and activities sections). Notice specifically the highlighting 
of the phases section, and the three identified phases of the incident management process. 
It should be noted that the size of each of these phases is conceptual and are not static 
from one incident to the next. They may be larger or smaller in relation to each other, but 
were depicted in this figure as equal for graphical purposes. 
Figure 9.  Understanding the Process of Incident Management (Phases). 
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Introduction: The extent literature and doctrine describe throughout as few as 
two phases of emergency management and as many as seven. Furthermore, some denote 
them as phases of emergency management, others as phases of incident management, and 
still others as mission areas or planning areas. It can get confusing. If the term phases of 
emergency management is used, it may cause people to believe that everything done in 
those phases should be done by emergency managers. Or, if the terms missions or 
planning areas are used, then the context or time and phases is lost (as recent federal 
doctrine often leaves out the concept of phases). It is perhaps beneficial then to 
understand and have the context of the entire process of what incident management is 
being called, to include the sequence of events and inherent actions and activities, as well 
as who is involved in each. 
The following definitions are proposed.  
1. Preparedness 
Preparedness is referred to the period prior to an incident or imminent threat 
during which the combination of the separate component activities of prevention, 
protection, hazard mitigation, risk management, training, and planning occur.  
Justification: The sum of the activities of prevention, protection, hazard 
mitigation, risk management, training, and planning is the measure of achievement of the 
goal and ideal state of being prepared. A low sum equals greater vulnerability and lower 
preparedness. It should be noted that the goal of being completely prepared will always 
remain unattainable and illusive, as unknown vulnerabilities will always be present due to 
inherent uncertainty and limited predictive capabilities. The consistent known 
vulnerabilities and threats inherent to the operating environment should inform and focus 
the various component activities during the preparedness phase. Once a known active or 
imminent threat presents itself, passive preparedness activities transition into active crisis 
management or incident response activities. 
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2. Incident Response 
An incident response is the period after a known incident (see previous definition 
for incident) has occurred or once an active imminent threat becomes known and 
emergency responders seek to know the unknown and act to reduce or eliminate the 
immediate threats to life safety, environmental or property damage, or economic loss, and 
ensure scene security and safety. 
Justification: Whether it is a car accident, an earthquake, an explosion, active 
shooter, cyber-attack, or other type of incident, emergency responders from various 
incident management disciplines will perform one of the incident command, crisis 
management, or disaster support coordination activities depending on the size or 
complexity of the incident. Regardless of the size of the incident, actions must be taken at 
some level to ensure the scene is secure and no continued or additional threats exist, 
which requires an action of volition known as incident response. It should be noted that 
until scene safety and security are established, the incident response could best be 
described as chaotic. Safety and security may be established early or after a seemingly 
long period of time.  
3. Consequence Management 
The period during which actions are taken to return to or establish a new normal 
state and direct remediation efforts are undertaken is known as consequence 
management.  
Justification: Consequence management is begun once the scene of an incident 
(or parts of the scene) or the threat environment are determined by incident command or 
crisis management personnel to be safe or secure enough to begin recovery operations 
(debris removal, repopulation, repatriation, rebuilding, environmental remediation, cyber 
improvement activity/repair, etc.).  
E. SENSE MAKING CHARACTERISTICS (CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK) 
As presented in Figure 10, the characteristics discussed are simple/obvious, 
complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder. 
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This figure is a conceptual diagram of the process of incident management over time, and 
the components therein. This figure applies to the entire sense making characteristics 
(Cynefin Framework) section (similar graphs apply to the prior phases and following 
activities sections). Notice specifically the highlighting of the Cynefin Framework 
section, and the inherent sense making characteristics of each phase of incident 
management, and its cyclical nature. 
Figure 10.  Understanding the Process of Incident Management (Cynefin 
Framework). 
Introduction: The Cynefin Framework is a sense-making and problem-solving 
framework that helps define the characteristics of understanding in the transition between 
and classification of domains between disorder and chaos, and obvious simplicity. The 
Cynefin Framework is a conceptual model in its own right, used to describe sense 
making. As a sense-making conceptual model, the Cynefin Framework is well-suited for 
informing the chronological sense-making characteristics of this larger proposed incident 
management conceptual model. The line between what is simple, or otherwise obvious, 
and what is chaotic, or seemingly unknowable, can be described as disastrous, where 
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complacency results in failure. Thus, preparedness becomes a paramount and primary 
aspect of incident management. Regardless of preparedness, or how prepared a person, 
group, organization, or agency is however, the moment an incident occurs, it must be 
made sense of, recognized, and processed. This process may take place in a relatively 
short or protracted amount of time depending on several factors (preparedness, 
complexity or dynamism of incident, familiarity or experience, etc.). Understanding the 
sense-making process helps to define what activities are occurring, what activities should 
be occurring, who the relevant participants are or should be, and provides a better 
understanding of the appropriate next steps and desired outcomes. Understanding the 
sense-making patterns also helps the incident management enterprise understand itself 
and can serve to improve the amount of time it takes to gain an effective perspective on a 
situation. An incident manager should understand the sense-making process of incidents 
to understand themselves and their role in the process better.  
The following definitions are proposed.  
1. Simple/Obvious 
The Cynefin Framework defines simple/obvious as the period in which “the 
relationship between cause and effect is obvious to all” and the approach to making 
decisions is to sense, categorize, and then respond.92 This sense-making category applies 
to the earliest preparedness phase actions and latest consequence management phase 
actions of incident management. 
Justification: The most basic and simple preparedness actions should be either 
simple or obvious, or both. When beginning to increase preparedness, the various 
activities and measurement of prevention, protection, hazard mitigation, risk 
management, training, and planning become more intertwined and interdependent, and 
inherently more complicated. Additionally, once incident response demobilization has 
taken place, and as consequence management and response activities, processes, and 
roles and responsibilities become well defined and categorized, decisions become 
                                                 
92 Christopher Bellavita, “Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” Homeland Security Affairs, vol. II, no. 3 
(2006): 1–21. 
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obvious or simple. All that should be required during these periods is to determine the 
need, categorize it, and act.  
2. Complicated 
The Cynefin Framework defines complicated as the period in which “the 
relationship between cause and effect requires analysis or some other form of 
investigation and/or the application of expert knowledge,” and the approach to making 
decisions is to sense, analyze, and then respond.93 This sense-making category applies to 
the primary preparedness and consequence management phases of incident management.  
Justification: Advanced preparedness activities require technical hazard 
mitigation analysis, risk management analysis, and several levels of preparedness 
evaluation. The various activities inherent to advanced preparedness are tightly woven, 
interconnected, and dependent. Additionally, during the first steps and earliest activities 
of the consequence management phase of incident management, significant evaluation 
occurs of recovery capabilities, needs, priorities, stakeholders, roles and responsibilities, 
cost reimbursement processes, and other issues that have to be categorized and 
mechanized, many of which are interdependent and tightly woven.  
3. Complex 
The Cynefin Framework defines complex as the period in which “the relationship 
between cause and effect can only be perceived in retrospect, but not in advance,” and the 
approach to making decisions is to probe, sense, and then respond.94 This sense-making 
category applies to the pre-incident crisis management and “demobilization,” or 
consequence management transition activities of the incident response phase of incident 
management. 
Justification: When an active imminent threat becomes known, actions must be 
taken to prevent it if possible, protect targets, mitigate damages, complete just-in-time 
training, gather intelligence, information, and situational awareness, deploy or dispatch 
                                                 
93 Bellavita, “Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” 1–21. 
94 Ibid. 
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assets, etc. Many of these activities are tightly interwoven and may have to be 
accomplished within a defined time period creating a necessity for prioritization, 
expediency, and activity triage. It is an inherently complex process that may have 
extremely high stakes. Additionally, during the transition from incident response to 
consequence, management incident commanders must balance the risk of undiscovered 
persistent threats or hazards, reemergence of threats or hazards, other unknown factors 
and the need to demobilize, rest or reduce resources, begin recovery activities and site 
remediation actions. The transition between incident response and consequence 
management may not be linear and may require remobilizing response assets to areas or 
environments previously thought to be secure and safe. This process or transition is 
inherently complex, potentially fraught with risk, and requires investigation and loosely 
defined threshold determinations.  
4. Chaotic 
The Cynefin Framework defines chaotic as the period in which “there is no 
relationship between cause and effect at a systems level,” and the approach to making 
decisions is to act, sense, and then respond.95 This sense-making category applies to the 
post-incident and pre-demobilization incident command, crisis management, and strategic 
support coordination activities during the incident response phase of incident 
management.  
Justification: During the post-incident and pre-demobilization activities of the 
incident response phase of incident management, the cause of the incident is often rarely 
known, and emergency responders are forced to be primarily reactive in nature, 
increasing incident command structures, activating department operations centers and 
emergency operations centers as necessary depending on the perceived or estimated 
complexity and dynamism of the incident. Often assets are dispatched to the scene 
without knowing the extent of the threat or hazard. In this sense, emergency responders 
and incident management practitioners from all disciplines are acting (responding to) 
then sensing and observing once they arrive at the scene or begin their respective actions, 
                                                 
95 Bellavita, “Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” 1–21. 
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and then respond based on their limited observations or knowledge. Once the extent of 
the hazard or threat is known, and it is determined that sufficient resources or assets have 
been applied to the incident, and the threat begins to ebb, the incident then begins to 
transition from chaotic to complex.  
5. Disorder 
The Cynefin Framework defines disorder as “the state of not knowing what type 
of causality exists and people revert to their own comfort zone in making decisions.”96 
This sense-making category applies specifically to the events immediately surrounding 
the incident prior to the arrival or response of emergency responders during the incident 
response phase of incident management.  
Justification: When an incident happens, people are generally acting with very 
limited knowledge and their actions are the product of an inherent desire for self-
preservation and safety. These actions may even be at the subconscious or involuntary 
reaction level. There is little to no ability to apply systems or mechanisms consciously 
during this phase. These actions might often be referred to as “fight or flight” actions. 
F. ACTIVITIES 
As presented in Figure 11, the activities discussed are incident management, 
incident command, crisis management, emergency management, risk management, 
recovery, prevention, protection, hazard mitigation, planning, and training. 
                                                 
96 Bellavita, “Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” 1–21. 
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This figure is a conceptual diagram of the process of incident management over time, and 
the components therein. This figure applies to the entire activities section (similar graphs 
apply to the phases and sense making sections). Notice specifically the highlighting of the 
activities section, and the various activities that take place during each phase. 
Additionally, notice how several of the preparedness phase activities transition in to the 
activity of crisis management as impending incidents and threats become present. 
Figure 11.  Understanding the Process of Incident Management (Activities). 
Introduction: Just as important as understanding the various types of incident 
managers or the various organizations and locations involved in incident management, it 
is also important to define and understand the various activities that should be occurring 
at those organizations and locations by the various types of incident managers. Certain 
activities might be performed by various incident management actors or disciplines, 
while others might be performed exclusively by a certain type of incident manager. It 
should be stated that sometimes a particular incident manager might be expected to 
perform activities traditionally reserved for an incident manager of a different type. It 
does not mean that certain incident managers do more than the defined roles and 
responsibilities for their discipline type; it simply means they are wearing multiple hats 
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and performing the duties of multiple incident manager types. This situation might be 
particularly common in smaller jurisdictions or municipalities where an incident manager 
of a certain type is forced to carry the burden of several incident manager types. 
Understanding what activities an incident manager is expected to carry out, and what 
activities are inherent to what incident management phases, practitioners, or structures 
will help incident managers be more effective and meet expectations appropriately. It 
should be noted that the following list of proposed definitions concerns actions and not 
goals. (i.e., the definition of the action of emergency management is not necessarily the 
same as the goal.) The goal, for all these activities, can probably be stated as saving lives, 
property, and the environment. However, just because that is the goal does not mean it is 
appropriate for every actor to do all the incident management activities necessary to 
accomplish that goal.  
The following definitions are proposed. 
1. Incident Management 
Incident management refers to the combined activities performed by all 
disciplines and professions during all phases of the incident management life cycle. 
Justification: Regardless of whether an incident becomes an emergency, a 
disaster, or a catastrophe, as incidents become larger or more dynamic and complex, the 
scope of the management of that incident scales up accordingly. More disciplines may 
need to become involved, department operations centers may need to be activated, 
emergency operations centers may need to be activated, and they may each have their 
own specialized multi-agency coordination groups. While each of these various entities 
may be performing different activities, they are all still working towards the same goal, 
the recovery from the incident (or incidents) that required their involvement. Thus, these 
collective efforts, activities, and endeavors all fall under the umbrella of incident 
management.  
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2. Incident Command 
Incident command encompasses all of the emergency response activities that 
occur within the defined scene under the purview and organizational structure and 
authority of the incident commander as defined by the ICS.  
Justification: The ICS is a well-defined and widely adopted framework outlining 
the authorities and most effective organizational structure for managing incidents at the 
scene. Any individual with responsibilities for saving lives, property, or the environment 
at the scene of an incident falls under the ICS. 
3. Crisis Management 
Crisis management is the just-in-time discipline or function of specific activities 
of active prevention, protection, hazard mitigation, risk management, training, planning, 
and other problem-solving activities required during the rapid onset of pre-incident 
awareness of a known imminent threat (posing generally limited organizational change), 
or post-incident at locations where cascading or related incidents have yet to occur. 
Justification: A crisis can be defined in many different ways, but unfortunately, 
none are very satisfying in relation to incident management (see the literature review). 
Little consensus has been reached for what a crisis means specifically. As described in 
the literature review, the common preeminent perspectives within crisis theory seem to 
place the responsibility of crisis management on the person or organization to which the 
crisis is happening, which can be compared to people in middle of a psychological 
breakdown acting as their own therapist. This approach seems foolhardy when defining 
or operating as a crisis manager, and actually, creates a bit of a paradox as many 
definitions of a crisis have elements describing them as unmanageable (the paradox in 
other words is being a manager of the unmanageable). It seems more appropriate to view 
crisis managers as an outside force who attempt to stabilize, marginalize, or isolate a 
crisis from the outside, especially if that external crisis stands as a threat to their own 
organization or capability. Thus, for the definition provided previously, crisis 
management is the use of discipline and function specific capabilities, tools, assets, and 
resources to eliminate or reduce the existing threat. It should be noted that only those 
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with assets, resources, capabilities, and authorities to prevent, protect, and mitigate 
threats actively participate in crisis management. Since incident commanders have an 
already existing incident and defined scene to manage, and since prevention and 
protection and mitigation activities would fall under the umbrella of incident command or 
response activities on scene, it does not seem appropriate to apply the term crisis 
management to incident command scenarios. DOCs and function specific operations 
centers with control over response assets (like Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
crisis management centers, cyber-security operations centers, public works operations 
centers, etc.) and have access to threat or hazard intelligence is where crisis management 
most commonly takes place. Since EOCs do not have direct operational control over field 
assets that would do the active threat prevention, target protection, damage mitigation, 
etc., very little crisis management occurs at EOCs, and generally, only passively. It 
should be noted that crisis management activities might occur long after an incident 
occurs. For example, if a threat-specific incident occurs, say a bombing of some sort, it is 
uncertain if other potential targets exist, but a known threat to those targets may exist, 
and active measures to protect and reduce exposure to those targets may have to happen. 
Or, after an earthquake, for example, several incident scenes may be related to the 
immediate damage of the earthquake, but impending incidents may be related to 
infrastructure or life safety that might require a crisis response (actions that might be 
considered mitigatory in nature had the response phase not been initiated).  
4. Emergency Management 
Emergency management refers to the collaborative senior and executive level 
strategic decision-making and support coordination amongst various functions and 
disciplines within a larger organization containing various departments, disciplines, or 
professions.  
Justification: At EOCs, and other support centers, senior leaders from various 
functions, disciplines, and professions collaborate to create strategy and policy guiding 
incident command support, crisis management priorities, public information, recovery, 
mass care and shelter, evacuation support, etc. Very few, if any field or operational 
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assets, are directly controlled from the EOC. EOCs, using information received from 
DOCs and field units, create the strategies and policies to be carried out operationally by 
DOCs to support incident command activities, crisis management activities, and victim 
support activities.  
5. Risk Management 
Risk management is the activity of adjusting preparedness activities to reduce the 
risk to an acceptable level. The smaller the gap between preparedness and vulnerabilities, 
the closer the goal of being prepared is. 
Risk: The gap between preparedness and vulnerabilities weighted by probability 
and severity.  
Vulnerability: The combination of known and unknown hazards, threats, and 
capability deficiencies as determined by assessments. 
Assessment: The risk management activity of increasing the knowns and 
reducing the unknowns associated with vulnerabilities and their inherent probabilities and 
severities, as well as increasing awareness. 
Hazard Assessment: Determining vulnerabilities associated with exposure to 
pre-existing natural and man-made conditions, events, or circumstances that could lead to 
or contribute to an unplanned or undesirable event. 
Threat Assessment: Determining vulnerabilities associated with credible and 
serious threats of intent, as well as the likelihood that they will be carried out in the 
future. 
Capabilities Assessment: Determining vulnerabilities associated with 
knowledge, resource, and skills performance deficiencies. 
Justification: The less robust the hazard, threat, and capabilities assessments are, 
the greater the unknown vulnerabilities and their potential probabilities and severities are. 
The greater the unknown vulnerabilities are, the lower the dependability of the 
vulnerability factor is. The lower the dependability of the vulnerability factor is, the more 
difficult the gap between preparedness and vulnerabilities is to define. The lower the 
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preparedness and vulnerability gap definition is, the higher the risk becomes. The higher 
the risk becomes, the more difficult risk management becomes. The more difficult risk 
management becomes, the harder it becomes to reach the goal of being prepared.  
6. Recovery 
Recovery includes all the post-incident response actions taken to return to a 
normal or new normal state to include site remediation, evacuee repatriation, cost 
recovery, disaster assistance center establishment, expedited building permit centers, 
cyber-infrastructure repair or reactivation, etc.  
Justification: Just because the threat or hazard has been contained, removed, or 
has ended, does not mean that elements related to the incident may not still need 
managing. The consequences of the damage caused by the incident still need to be 
managed to ensure long-term adverse effects are not incurred due to the damage or 
incident response operations, which is the consequence management aspect of incident 
management. Much of the initial consequence management is coordinated by EOCs as 
part of the strategic support and coordination activities. Eventually, however, EOCs 
deactivate and the continued long-term recovery operations are managed by various 
functions, departments, or support centers.  
7. Prevention 
Prevention relates to the act of actively or passively reducing or interdicting the 
occurrence of incidents caused by hazards or threats. 
Justification: Actively preventing a human threat may include arresting someone 
based on actionable intelligence, while passively preventing a human threat may include 
advertising an increase in surveillance activity, and thereby, deterring potential attackers 
(it can be debated whether deterrence is in fact prevention). Actively preventing a hazard 
or natural threat is not the same as mitigating it (like using sand bags to mitigate flood 
damage. The flood is not prevented; only the damage has been mitigated). Preventing a 
hazard or natural threat incident is difficult and sometimes impossible (i.e., stopping 
earthquakes). Using vaccines to prevent the spread of dangerous diseases and viruses is 
 79 
one example of the prevention of natural threats or hazards. Releasing sub-surface 
thermal pressure to stop a volcano from erupting would be another example of the 
prevention of a natural threat or hazard.  
8. Protection 
Protection is the act of increasing the active security posture or presence for any 
potential suspected or known target (human, building, or infrastructure).  
Justification: Like prevention, protection is not mitigation. An action taken to 
reduce the amount of damage something might take due to the occurrence of an incident 
(hazard or threat) is a mitigation measure. Protection is the increasing of active security 
around a known or suspected target. The term target denotes human intent, and thusly, 
requires an active conscious security awareness and presence through volition. The only 
difference between active and passive protection is the existence of a known active threat 
or aggressor.  
9. Hazard Mitigation 
Hazard mitigation relates to the act of reducing exposure to and the severity of 
hazards, vulnerabilities, system failures, and threats.  
Justification: Any action not preventing an incident from happening (prevention) 
or actively securing or protecting (protection) designed to increase the resilience, 
survivability, or redundancy, and reduce potential damage or threat or hazard exposure 
would be considered a mitigation measure. Putting sand bags out to create a barrier to 
flood waters is an example of a mitigation measure. Putting shatter resistant glass on a 
building or vehicle may be considered a mitigation measure. Adding communications 
channels or mechanisms to an operations center may be considered a mitigation measure. 
Hardening a facility to reduce the damage caused by explosions can be considered a 
mitigation measure. Creating an auto-backup capability for cyber-infrastructure may be 
considered a mitigation measure. Reinforcing a building to ensure occupants are not 
injured by falling walls or objects in an earthquake is an example of a mitigation 
measure. Delineating between mitigation, prevention, and protection is key, as it helps 
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define functional roles and responsibilities, and appropriate mission spaces based on 
authority and function.  
10. Planning 
Planning is the process of defining roles and responsibilities, actions, capabilities, 
and procedures related to scenarios or functions, as well as the process for creating tasks, 
objectives, strategies, and priorities during an incident.  
Justification: During the preparedness phase of incident management, planning is 
used to pre-determine the actions to be taken by various stakeholders or functions in the 
event of a general or specific incident. During the incident response phase of incident 
management, planning is used to establish an appropriate operational tempo and create an 
action plan outlining the tasks, objectives, strategies, and priorities for the specific 
incident. In the consequence management phase of incident management, planning is 
used to determine the roles and responsibilities of various departments and stakeholders 
and outline specific recovery priorities and procedures germane to the particular incident.  
11. Training 
Training encompasses the actions taken to increase incident managers’ individual 
or group knowledge, skills, and abilities related to their specific incident management 
roles and responsibilities before or during an incident. 
Justification: Training, whether it is well in advance or just-in-time, is crucial to 
the success of incident management. Having the necessary KSAs to execute an incident 
management function effectively is what ensures the greatest success and effectiveness of 
the entire incident management structure and framework. Having the knowledge of the 
system and the function specific details, combined with the refined abilities and trained 
skills, is the best measure of ensuring individual and group incident management 
competence.  
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G. MISSION SPACES   
As presented in Figure 12, the mission spaces discussed are ICS support, strategic 
support and coordination (emergency management), extended strategic support and 
coordination, area command, unified command, unified area command, extended ICS 
support, and elected officials. 
 
 
This figure is a conceptual diagram of the various mission spaces of organizations and 
practitioners of incident management and their relation to the incident. It applies to the 
entire mission spaces section. Notice specifically the policy advisory group (PAG) 
relation to the EMC and area command organizations and how their executive authority 
over their various departments relates to the other organizational components. 
Figure 12.  Understanding Incident Response Mission Space. 
Introduction: Once incident managers understand what type of incident they are 
involved in, what type of incident management practitioner they are, what organizational 
structure they are operating in, what specific incident management activities they are 
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performing, and what phase of the incident they are operating in, the next key aspect of 
understanding is their area of responsibility, area of focus, and authority. Understanding 
what aspects of the incident these incident managers are applying to their organizational 
focus and activities on is key to ensuring that unnecessary overlap, redundancy, and 
mission creep is not occurring. For example, as an emergency manager in a national level 
emergency management center during a major disaster, then the focus probably will not 
be on organizing the same strategic support and coordination that the emergency 
managers in the local EMCs are organizing; instead the focus will be on the national level 
strategic coordination and support to the local EMCs. The same may be true of an area 
commander not focusing on the tactics at the scene on which an incident manager may 
already be focusing. These various areas are called mission spaces. Understanding 
organizational mission space will help ensure the necessary activities are happening at all 
the various levels of incident management during incidents of any size or complexity. 
The following definitions are proposed. 
1. Incident Command System Support 
The incident command mission space is everything (to include assets and 
personnel) within the designated single incident area and under the authority of the 
incident commander or unified commanders’ authority.  
Justification: The incident command system mission space is limited to the 
boundaries of the single designated incident area to ensure the appropriate span of 
control, proper safety oversight, and focus of roles and responsibilities. With authority 
over one incident, the incident commander makes tactical decisions to address the safety 
of life, property, and the environment. Everything (to include support personnel at the 
scene, such as utility workers, critical incident stress management, etc.) is under the 
authority of the incident commander.  
2. Strategic Support and Coordination (Emergency Management) 
Strategic support and coordination relating to emergency management is an 
activity happening outside of the designated incident area (but potentially within the 
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larger geographical disaster area causing the incidents), but within the local jurisdiction 
or municipality containing the incidents. The authorities of incident command and 
strategic support and coordination do not overlap.  
Justification: Strategic support and coordination activities occurring at EMCs 
and other support centers do not take place within the designated incident scene because 
their focus is greater than the incident itself. Strategic support activities are focused on 
the continuity of government services, the availability of resources to the incidents, and 
the response or support activities occurring outside of the incident scene (shelters, 
evacuation centers, routes, etc.). Once support assets, personnel, etc. arrive at the scene of 
an incident, or at the staging area, they are under the authority of the incident commander 
and fall under the ICS. Strategic support and coordination may be happening at several 
levels (local, state, federal, international) at the same time depending on the combined 
size and complexity of the event.  
3. Extended Strategic Support and Coordination 
Extended strategic support and coordination refers to the strategic support 
coordination occurring in support of the local government’s strategic support and 
coordination activities. 
Justification: Often in large complex events, county, state, and federal agencies 
activate operations centers in direct support of major incidents that happen at a local level 
or in a municipality. These operations centers may support field (tactical ICS) level 
activities with resource allocation, or they may support the strategic support and 
coordination occurring at the local level through finance operations, sheltering 
operations, legal policy and code creation or council, public information support, etc. In 
that case, they are supporting the support and coordination efforts in an extended manner. 
4. Area Command 
Area command is the singular consolidated authority structure established to 
prioritize incidents, broker scarce or limited resources, and support various incidents with 
several incident commanders or an incident that has become too geographically or 
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jurisdictionally large or diffuse to have a single incident commander. It is organized in an 
ICS-centric structure to support field ICS. 
Justification: When various incidents are taking place in a jurisdiction or 
amongst various jurisdictions with limited response resources, a brokering authority must 
be established to determine who will receive those scarce resources. Additionally, when 
an incident has become so large or complex (a large wildfire, for example) that a single 
incident commander cannot effectively maintain control or oversight of the safety and 
tactics at the scene, then several incident commanders may be established to address 
defined geographical or incident specific areas over which a single coordinating, 
prioritizing, and support authority should be established, being the area commander.  
5. Unified Command 
A unified command includes the collaborative leadership and command amongst 
commanders of various response disciplines during complex incidents with no clear 
discipline lead, or amongst commanders of the same discipline when a single incident 
impacts multiple jurisdictions and resources must be shared but are not scarce or limited. 
It is organized in an ICS-centric structure to support field ICS. 
Justification: Emergency response agencies often have areas of responsibility. 
When an incident borders on their area of responsibility and that of another agency’s, it 
likely requires a collaborative response approach, while still maintaining authority of the 
agency’s respective assets and tactics, which is one scenario where unified command is 
appropriate. Another example may be a complex incident requiring the response and 
leadership of multiple disciplines like a bombing where multiple victims require 
emergency medical service response and control, but the potential continued security risk 
dictates leadership and control by law enforcement, and the potential existence of 
hazardous materials may require the leadership and control of fire or hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) teams, which is just one example of a complex incident that might require 
the use of a unified command. Another example may include the inclusion of private 
industry. A unified command generally only exists as a transitional state of being for 
incident command and management. It exists until uncertainty becomes certain, as 
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disorder transitions through chaos to complexity. It primarily only exists during chaos 
and early complexity. It necessitates fluidity.  
6. Unified Area Command 
A unified area command includes the collaborative leadership and command 
amongst commanders of various response disciplines when multiple complex incidents 
with no clear discipline lead exist, or amongst commanders of the same discipline when a 
single incident impacts multiple jurisdictions and resources must be shared and are scarce 
or limited, but no obvious agency lead can be determined or agreed upon. It is organized 
in an ICS-centric structure to support field ICS. 
Justification: In a major disaster, several complex incidents may exist, or 
multiple incidents from various single disciplines. If all these incidents are pulling from 
the same scarce resource pool, and a collaborative prioritization of incidents requiring 
those resources is needed to ensure an effective collective response, then a unified area 
command may be required. For example, during a catastrophic earthquake, several 
incidents with mass casualties, several fire incidents, several HAZMAT incidents, and 
several law enforcement related incidents may result. Several of those incidents may 
require resources from one or more of the other disciplines. Additionally, an incident may 
occur that if collectively prioritized, may result in a more effective response than if 
multiple incidents are prioritized separately. Also multiple incidents across jurisdictions 
may result where it might not be politically feasible to have a single area commander 
(when an incident or incidents cross national borders, for example) and a unified area 
command may be most appropriate. It may also apply when a private agency is involved 
or when on private property. A unified area command generally only exists as a 
transitional state of being for incident command and management. It exists until 
uncertainty becomes certain, as disorder transitions through chaos to complexity. It 
primarily only exists during chaos and early complexity. It necessitates fluidity.  
7. Extended ICS Support 
Extended ICS support references the county, state, or federal ICS response 
support structures, organizations, and operations centers beyond the local level that 
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deploy assets and resources directly to field level incident or area commanders. It is often 
organized in an ICS-centric structure to support field ICS.  
Justification: These structures are the extended resource support sources that can 
be called upon in extremely complex or large events. The county, state, or federal 
government often has response assets in several of the common and uncommon response 
disciplines that can be leveraged at the local level should they be needed.  
8. Elected Officials 
Elected officials are the conduit between constituents and response and 
coordination structures for understanding and communicating the community’s needs. 
They politically enact policy established at lower levels, and garner political and financial 
support from higher political offices.  
Justification: Elected officials have a key role in supporting and reinforcing the 
incident management system. Key information may be communicated about response and 
coordination efforts to the public through elected officials who can often help reduce 
potential interruptions, conflicts, or inefficiencies due to low public support. 
Additionally, elected officials can help to enact policy that can grant necessary powers to 
public safety officials for response, or recovery measures.  
H. COMPETENCIES 
As presented in Figure 13, the competencies discussed are incident management 
knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
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This figure is a conceptual diagram of the various practitioners of incident management 
and their knowledge, skill, and ability characteristics and development trends. It applies 
to the entire competencies section. Notice specifically the areas of common or similar 
skills that might apply to the various practitioners. It is particularly key in that the five 
arms are placed in relation to their common interface, and thusly, their skills should 
reflect that cross-functional awareness and capability. 
Figure 13.  Incident Management Knowledge, Skills and Abilities. 
Introduction: Among the currently existing incident management doctrine, core 
competencies are defined. These core competencies help to describe and define areas of 
deficiency and performance within the incident management enterprise at large. 
However, a more granular level of competency should be addressed at the individual 
practitioner level. The competency of an individual incident management practitioner and 
the collective competency of all the practitioners within the incident management 
enterprise inform the efficacy of the entire enterprise. The composition of individuals’ 
incident management competency should be defined by their respective incident 
management KSAs. The value of the combination of KSAs is the measure of an incident 
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management practitioner. Understanding these integral parts to individual competency 
will help practitioners understand their areas of strength and weakness, and help define a 
path to improvement. Incident management practitioner who increase their individual 
competencies help to increase the overall efficacy and competency of the incident 
management enterprise, like a rising tide lifting all ships. 
The following definitions are proposed. 
1. Incident Management Knowledge 
Incident management knowledge refers to the awareness, understanding, 
familiarization, and education about the entire incident management universe that makes 
it possible to understand the lexicon, concepts, relationships, ideas, and principles that 
make up the various incident management doctrinal elements and components.  
Justification: Exposure to the universe of incident management in general may 
happen in a variety of ways, whether through school, employment, life experience, etc. 
Awareness, understanding, familiarization, and education about the universe of incident 
management may be gained through specific academic courses of study, through 
literature, through work experience and relationships, conversation and debate, etc. The 
more awareness, understanding, familiarization, and education attained about the incident 
management universe, the more knowledge people have. Knowledge is the first level of 
competency required to become a competent incident management practitioner within 
any incident management discipline.  
2. Incident Management Skills 
Incident management skills describe function and discipline specific capabilities 
provided through training courses that qualify someone to perform in a specific incident 
management functional capacity.  
Justification: After establishing a foundational knowledge base, a person 
appointed to fill a functional position or role at any level within the incident management 
universe must then complete function specific training to gain the initial primary skills 
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needed to perform or execute the assigned function. Many incident management training 
courses may be designed to provide both knowledge and skills.  
3. Incident Management Abilities 
Incident management abilities measure the proficiency level and refinement of the 
skills gained through training courses improved through practice, drills, exercises, 
repetition, and dynamic exposure.  
Justification: Once knowledge and skills are gained, they must be practiced, 
drilled, exercised, and repeated to increase proficiency, reaction time, confidence, and 
efficacy.  
I. PROPOSED INCIDENT MANAGEMENT CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
CONCLUSIONS 
This proposed incident management conceptual model’s topics and sections were 
determined by the guiding principles outlined at the beginning of the section, derived as a 
solution to the literature review’s findings of doctrinal shortfalls. The best examples of 
current and past definitions of the terms above, the FEMA Glossary of Terms,97 The 
Department of Homeland Security Risk Lexicon,98 or Dr. Blanchard’s Guide to 
Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, 
Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, & Legislation.99 Within these 
documents you will find over 500 various definitions for the combined 62 terms proposed 
in this study’s model. Many of the terms in this proposed model have no pre-existing 
definition in any of the existing literature, such as “Incident Manager”, surprisingly 
enough. It is not recommended that a one-for-one comparison of the proposed definitions 
and pre-existing definitions be done, as the value of the proposed definitions lies in the 
method of their genesis and their complementary nature, in that they were all created 
together for the purpose of synergy and are thus more complimentary, making the model 
                                                 
97 “Glossary,” June 15, 2015, https://emilms.fema.gov/IS700aNEW/glossary.htm. 
98 “DHS Risk Lexicon,” October 4, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-risk-lexicon. 
99 Blanchard, Guide to Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, 
Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders, & Legislation. 
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more comprehensive and thorough. Applying these principles throughout the conceptual 
model, in every topic and section, has created a comprehensive, consistent, and more 
satisfying model that addresses all the necessary aspects of the incident management 
enterprise and activities. Perhaps one of the most important conclusions to be taken away 
from this model is the value in maintaining consistent principles, paradigms, and lens of 
perspective in describing all aspects of incident management. Separating and segregating 
topics as separate planning endeavors to be undertaken by different entities with different 
perspectives, guiding principles, and paradigms can create disjointed and gap-riddled 
doctrine. A comprehensive single-effort approach of defining and describing all aspects 
of incident management concepts and components from bottom to top creates a more 
consistent and comprehensive model. To demonstrate the value of this approach, and of 
this proposed conceptual model, an analysis of application is conducted by testing 
retroactively this model on case examples (see Appendix B).  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section is a summary of the findings, results, and conclusions of this study. 
The findings are derived from a combination of the practitioner interviews conducted in 
the discovery and analysis portion of the study, the incident management literature 
review and analysis, the development and synthesis of the proposed new incident 
management conceptual model, and the application of that framework to the various case 
examples (found in Appendix B). The following conclusions can broadly be described as 
having a focus on doctrinal deficiencies, where the currently existing doctrine makes up a 
conceptual model with demonstrated lacking utility. There are two main categories of 
findings and recommendations. The first is crisis philosophy, operational movement of 
resources, and the role of DOCs. The second is regarding deficiencies in existing 
foundational term and concept definitions. The list of conclusions and recommendations 
follows. 
A. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CRISIS PHILOSOPHY, OPERATIONAL 
MOVEMENT OF RESOURCES, AND THE ROLE OF DEPARTMENT 
OPERATIONS CENTERS (DOCS) 
• A doctrinal gap exists in the definition of “crisis” as it relates to 
incident management as an event, mode, or phase. As is explored in the 
literature review, and described in the proposed new incident management 
conceptual framework, the definition of “crisis” within the incident 
management lexicon should have a pre-incident, threat, and mitigatory 
focus, as “crisis” denotes potential or impending peril as a result of un-
intervened existing events, trends, or phenomena.  
• A lack of doctrine addresses the role of DOCs within the incident 
management structure throughout the extent incident management 
literature, doctrine, and guidance. It is explored and discovered in the 
literature review that DOCs are all but non-existent in the national incident 
management literature and doctrine, and inadequately touched upon in 
most other sources of incident management doctrine and guidance. DOCs 
and continuity of operations planning and guidance should perhaps be 
interrelated in national guidance. 
• A lack of doctrine addresses the operational movement of resources 
among or between various incidents. It is explored and discovered in the 
literature review that resource movement outside or between incident 
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command structures (separate incidents) is missing from much of the 
existing doctrine and guidance. Not to be confused with mutual aid 
structures (that are only slightly more adequately addressed in national 
doctrine), the movement of resources belonging to one agency between 
incidents is hardly discussed, and should probably be addressed in DOC 
doctrine, which is also missing from most national doctrine. 
• Crisis management is perhaps most appropriately applied to the DOC 
level of incident management structures. As described in the proposed 
new conceptual model lexicon, it involves the application of discipline or 
function specific capabilities, tools, assets, and resources to eliminate or 
reduce an existing threat. If an incident has occurred, then it is no longer 
crisis management but incident command or response. Also, since only 
those with operational control of assets, resources, capabilities, and 
authorities to actively prevent, protect, and mitigate threats using real-time 
intelligence participate in crisis management, this means that crisis 
management is not occurring at EOCs since EOCs do not have direct 
operational control over assets as DOCs do.  
• A lack of doctrinal delineation occurs between operations centers and 
strategic coordination centers. As demonstrated in the literature review, 
throughout the extent incident management literature, little discussion or 
delineation is provided about the differences between tactical, operational, 
and strategic coordination actions. This lack of definition is a major gap in 
the doctrinal components of incident management and may be influencing 
mission creep and organizational conflict.  
The following are a list of corrective actions which may help to address the above 
listed conclusions:  
• The integration of “crisis”, “crisis management,”, and pre-incident 
and intra-incident operational concepts should be improved in 
incident management doctrine and it should address moral 
imperative, operational movement of resources between incidents, 
and discipline or function specific roles and responsibilities concepts. 
Also, it is necessary to improve this integration in local policies, 
emergency operations plans (EOPs), and annexes to EOPs. This study’s 
new proposed conceptual framework potentially has examples of ways to 
do that integration, which will help ensure comprehensive, holistic, and 
full-spectrum incident management concepts are addressed at all levels 
and also help to ensure buy-in from all the collaborating incident 
management enterprise agencies and disciplines. 
• More comprehensive incident management doctrine, guidance, and 
policy should be created at the federal, state, and local levels, which 
integrates DOCs specifically more intuitively and appropriately to 
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ensure the necessary separation between incident command and 
incident support or continuity-of-government functions. This study’s 
new proposed conceptual framework potentially has examples of ways to 
do that separation. Doing so will help to ensure inappropriate mission-
creep is avoided and help to ensure that practitioners with the most 
appropriate knowledge and discipline specific authority are controlling the 
movement of critical response assets. Most importantly, it will help to 
deconflict and assist the priorities and actions of the field and EOCs (or 
EMCs as proposed in the conceptual model). 
B. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING 
FOUNDATIONAL TERM AND CONCEPT DEFINITIONS 
• The definition of various incident management disciplines, actions, 
event types, activity levels, and other key components, and the 
differences between them, need to be more clearly delineated in 
foundational incident management documents. As was described by 
practitioners as an area of frustration during the practitioner interviews, 
demonstrated and explored during the literature review and analysis, and 
addressed in the proposed new incident management conceptual model, 
many gaps, obfuscations, and areas of vague definition occur within 
current incident management doctrine and guidance, which lends itself to 
conflicts and operational degradation, and potentially decreased public 
safety and response. With greater definition and clarity, and by closing 
existing gaps (as is done in this study’s proposed new incident 
management conceptual framework) incident management as an enterprise 
will become more effective, and incident management operations will 
become more successful and efficient.  
• Mission spaces of the various types of incident management 
practitioners and disciplines within the incident management 
enterprise are not defined, described, or bounded effectively enough 
in the primary and most widely referenced sources of incident 
management doctrine and guidance. This subject was described as 
frustrating by practitioners during the practitioner interviews, and explored 
and demonstrated during the literature review and analysis, then addressed 
in the proposed new conceptual model. A better venue for national 
dialogue is needed to determine the best bounding of mission spaces. 
• Phases of incident management should be used as a tool for 
conceptual understanding, and three phases (preparedness, incident 
response, and consequence management) of incident management are 
perhaps sufficient for conveying the process. As explored in the 
literature review and analysis, and described and defined in the new 
proposed conceptual model, the use of phases in recent federal doctrine as 
a tool for understanding and conceptualizing incident management has 
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stopped. However, still great value can be found in the use of incident 
management phases as a tool for conceptual understanding, and phases 
have been poorly defined in older doctrinal and literature sources. The 
phases of incident management are an integral part to understanding the 
process and sense-making aspects of incident management. Furthermore, 
three phases (preparedness, incident response, and consequence 
management) of incident management are perhaps best for conveying the 
process, as described in the new proposed lexicon.  
• A difference exists between appropriate or necessary and 
inappropriate or unnecessary mission creep in incident management, 
as well as a lack of doctrinal delineation between them. This topic was 
mentioned in the practitioner interviews, and validated within the literature 
review. Interviewees gave examples, such as a county executing the 
responsibilities of a city on the city’s behalf without being asked or given 
expressed permission when the city has no resource capability to execute 
its roles and responsibilities for public safety as an example of potentially 
appropriate or necessary mission creep. Whereas, an EOC redundantly, 
inadvertently, or purposely directing tactical operations in the field or at 
the incident is an example of inappropriate mission creep.  
The following are a list of corrective actions which may help to address the above 
listed conclusions: 
• Practitioners should ensure practitioner, actor, and discipline mission 
spaces are bounded at the local level through local policies, EOPs, or 
annexes to EOPs. This study’s new proposed conceptual framework has 
examples of ways to potentially do that bounding, which will help to 
deconflict roles, responsibilities, actions, and operational frustrations 
amongst the practitioners, actors, and disciplines that make up the incident 
management enterprise while also potentially increasing overall efficacy 
and efficiency.  
• The concept of “phases” of incident management should be 
reintroduced into federal, state, and local doctrine, policy, and 
guidance. The use of incident management phases as a tool for conceptual 
understanding is still germane to the doctrine of incident management, as 
demonstrated in this study’s proposed conceptual model. The phases of 
incident management are an integral part to the comprehensive 
understanding of the process and sense-making aspects of incident 
management. Furthermore, three phases (preparedness, incident response, 
and consequence management) of incident management are appropriate 
for conveying the process, as demonstrated in the new proposed model.  
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APPENDIX A.  INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PRACTITIONER 
INTERVIEW 
“Understanding Incident Management” 
David S Flamm, 1402 
Advisor: Glen Woodbury 
Co-Advisor: Lauren Fernandez  
Name: 
Position: 
Years of Experience: 
Career Highlights: 
I. Are you an incident manager, crisis manager, emergency manager, risk 
manager, or some other type of practitioner? 
This question will help in determining what an incident management 
practitioner is, and where confusion might be found. 
II. Have you managed or participated operationally in a real world incident? 
This question will help to legitimize the perspectives of the interviewee. It 
may also illuminate a point of conflict inherent in policy generation. 
III. In your experience, what are the primary sources of incident 
management conflict, confusion, or disagreement, if any?  
This will hopefully illicit an answer pointing at my proposed problem 
statement without any leading statements or questions. 
IV. Have you ever witnessed a hindrance in incident management operations 
or activities due to doctrine interpretation? Examples? 
This will ideally garner data about historic conflict genesis and confirm 
aspects of my problem statement. 
V. In your experience, have organizational differences or inconsistencies 
ever hindered collaborative incident management operations or 
activities? Examples? 
This question will garner specific examples of my problem statement, 
especially pertaining to consistency in mutual aid operations. 
VI. Have you experienced or witnessed incident management mission creep 
(people getting out of their operational lanes) due to current incident 
management doctrine, plans, or policies? Examples? 
This will touch on the lack of bounded mission space within incident 
management, and hopefully provide specific examples. 
VII. Have you witnessed internal organizational conflict due to competing 
incident management doctrine interpretations? Examples? 
This will demonstrate the vague nature of existing doctrine, and inherent lack 
of clarity. 
VIII. Have other practitioners you’ve interacted with communicated having 
had similar experiences as those identified in the previous questions? 
This will expand the legitimacy of the results of these interviews. 
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IX. What has been the most helpful piece of incident management literature, 
doctrine, plans, or policy? 
This will hopefully garner some consensus and allow me to weight certain 
doctrine/literature in my literature review analysis. 
X. In your experience, what are the primary contributing factors related to 
operational performance in Incident Management? 
This will ideally specify issues specific to operations increasing the 
granularity of cause and effect analysis. 
XI. In your experience, what are the primary contributing factors to 
organizational/operational success in incident management? 
This will ideally specify issues specific to organizational makeup increasing 
the granularity of cause and effect analysis. 
XII. In your experience, what are the primary contributing factors related to 
incident management philosophy consistency or inconsistency? 
This will ideally specify issues specific to paradigms and philosophies 
increasing the granularity of cause and effect analysis. 
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APPENDIX B.  APPLYING THE PROPOSED MODEL TO CASE 
EXAMPLES 
Evaluating examples of large complex incident management events to determine 
what went well and where room for improvement is needed, is one way to determine the 
applicability and feasibility of this study’s proposed conceptual model. These case 
examples serve as a way to test a model on past phenomena much like testing a theory of 
stocks or commodities trading on historical graphs and activity. Case examples can also 
help to highlight areas where current models demonstrate trends of deficiency or conflict. 
The following models are evaluated in different ways depending on the data and 
information available about them. Regardless, each is distilled into the areas that worked 
well that coincide with this study’s proposed model, and the areas that proved deficient 
that this study’s proposed model would potentially alleviate. Four types of events or 
incidents are evaluated to ensure all or most types of events are covered, and to 
demonstrate the universal nature of this study’s proposed model. The four types of events 
include a major recent Stafford Act event, a major recent Non-Stafford Act event, a 
domestic terrorist Non-Stafford Act event, and an off-shore Non-Stafford Act event. The 
specific events evaluated are Hurricane Sandy, the recent national Ebola Virus response, 
the Boston Marathon bombing event, and the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill event. 
A. 2010 DEEP WATER HORIZON RESPONSE (OFF-SHORE NON-
STAFFORD ACT EVENT) 
Deepwater Horizon serves as a fairly recent and appropriate example of a large-
scale non-Stafford Act event with all the components of a large, complex, and dynamic 
incident management structure. The following description of the event is derived from 
the Coast Guard after action report:  
On the evening of April 20, 2010, an explosion aboard the Mobile 
Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon set off a chain of events that 
led to the sinking of the drilling unit and subsequent oil spill. On April 29, 
2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security declared the Deepwater 
Horizon incident a Spill of National Significance (SONS) under the 
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authority of the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR 300.323).100 
Due to the severity of the spill, the complexity of response efforts, and the 
potential impact on public health and the environment, this incident 
required extraordinary coordination among Federal and State agencies, 
tribal organizations, local governments, and BP, the responsible party. The 
response was a coordinated effort to secure the well, and contain and clean 
up the oil. A day after the declaration of the incident as a SONS, Admiral 
Thad Allen, United States Coast Guard, was designated as the National 
Incident Commander.101 
After several attempts, BP was successful in securing the wellhead on July 
15, 2010, and sealing the well on September 19, 2010. This incident 
tested, and in some cases exceeded, the limits of the Nation’s oil spill 
response resources and capabilities developed after the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Alaska. The scope and duration of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill presented complex challenges to the response 
community. These challenges provided the catalyst to adapt proven 
technologies, employ new or innovative technologies, and apply ever-
changing response tactics to address a dynamic response environment.102 
In 2011, the Coast Guard completed an incident specific preparedness review 
(ISPR)103 on the BP Oil Spill commonly referred to as the Deepwater Horizon Incident. 
To evaluate this event in relation to this study’s proposed conceptual model, some of the 
Coast Guard’s report findings, observations, and recommendations are evaluated to 
determine where the proposed model might have closed gaps, removed deficiencies, or is 
in conflict with the findings. 
1. Conclusions in Support of Proposed Model 
• A section of the conclusions surrounding the organization of the event 
points to appointed, executive, and elected officials having a key role in 
the overall response.104 This key role demonstrates as evidence that like 
                                                 
100 Robert J. Papp Jr., “Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)—Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill” 





104 Ibid., 57–61. 
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the proposed model demonstrates, elected officials and executives are 
indeed a part of the incident management enterprise, and its success and 
should be considered in doctrine as such. 
• This document consistently hails the ICS as being an effective system, as 
demonstrated in the following quotes: “…ICS is well understood, accepted 
and utilized by most State and local emergency managers and the oil spill 
response community.”105 Also, “…the ICS organization worked well 
during this event.”106 This praise demonstrates that, at least at the incident 
level, ICS should continue to be the system of practice, as is outlined in 
this study’s proposed model. 
• The document states, “Leaders who are expected to perform as crisis 
managers need to be trained and experienced in crisis management, and 
should not be placed into such positions without applicable training.”107 
This statement supports the proposed model’s description of crisis 
managers and that elected officials need to develop skills and abilities just 
like all other incident management practitioners. 
• According to the review, “White House and senior DHS staff were 
initially unfamiliar with the NCP response processes and their application 
to the Deepwater Horizon incident, which caused some confusion among 
senior leadership during the first few days of the response.”108 In addition, 
“There is a natural inclination for local officials to veer towards a Stafford 
Act response under the NRF because they are familiar with it and have 
greater control,”109, and finally, “There is a natural inclination for local 
officials to veer towards a Stafford Act response under the NRF because 
they are familiar with it and have greater control.”110 These observations 
and findings demonstrate that event or scenario specific frameworks and 
models are not intuitive, as evidenced by the desire for local governments 
to utilize Stafford Act models due to their familiarity. One standard model 
for all event types should be instituted. 
• Additionally, the findings and observations of this review demonstrate that 
a duplicity or variances in doctrines is a hindrance to incident management 
success. The following observation is an example, “During this incident, 
there was extensive confusion between doctrines set forth in the NRF and 
the NCP. The ‘emergency management’ community, comprising State and 
                                                 
105 Papp Jr., “Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)—Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” 71. 
106 Ibid., 4. 
107 Ibid., 60. 
108 Ibid., 64. 
109 Ibid., 71. 
110 Ibid. 
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local emergency management officials, was unfamiliar with the NCP and 
the ‘oil spill response’ community did not see the applicability of the NRF 
to an oil spill.”111  
• The following observation demonstrates the need to integrate the concept 
of crisis better into incident management doctrine, “Superb crisis 
leadership is essential for effective response to a major national domestic 
incident.”112 
• One observation stated, “Organizational structures were not in place prior 
to the incident to accommodate the use of both the NCP and the NRF.”113 
However, if one consistent model for all events was used, as this study 
proposes, it would not be an issue. 
• The following observation and finding demonstrates that stimulus events 
need to be better defined, “The NRF created the basis for preparedness for 
State and local officials in planning for Stafford Act responses. The NRF 
does not contemplate an oil spill as an initiating event under the NRF. 
Environmental incidents, generally, fall outside the ambit of the National 
Planning Scenarios, which inform preparedness activities under the 
NRF.”114 This study attempts to close this gap by providing illumination 
to stimulus event types that allows for greater universal categorization.  
2. Conclusions Not in Support of Proposed Model 
• Throughout this document, the terms “crisis leadership” and “crisis 
management” are used somewhat interchangeably without great definition 
or specificity.115 It also points out that elected officials and “leaders” are 
crisis managers.116 This viewpoint is specifically in conflict with the 
proposed model, which identifies elected officials specifically as crisis 
leaders, but specifically excludes them from the category of crisis 
managers. While crisis management, and seemingly synonymously crisis 
leadership, seems to be popularly recognized as the interface with the 
public and public perception management, as this study highlights, a need 
does exist for greater definition in regards to the concept of “crisis.” It is 
another example of how the term crisis is thrown around with cavalier 
disregard for specificity. 
                                                 
111 Papp Jr., “Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)—Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” 71. 
112 Ibid., 60. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 71. 
115 Ibid., 60. 
116 Ibid., 57. 
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• According to the review ICS and National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) worked well.117 In fact, several times, NIMS and ICS are referred 
to synonymously as having worked effectively. It might be contended that 
ICS worked well where applied, but the fact that the National Response 
Framework (NRF) had room for improvement,118 which is a part of the 
NIMS execution framework arguably, demonstrates that the success of 
NIMS should in fact be considered separately of ICS. ICS is a field level 
incident response and command structure, where NIMS is the larger 
description of the entire incident management endeavor, which obviously 
had flaws based on the number of findings and observations. To address 
the two collectively is disingenuous and serves little purpose for future 
improvement.  
• It is stated throughout this review that the “national incident commander 
model” uniquely instituted for this event worked well.119 Yet, the national 
incident commander for this event consistently is referred to as a “crisis 
manager” in this review.120 However, this reference lends itself to the idea 
that incident command and crisis management are synonymous. Whereas, 
the need for a “person in charge” is called for several times.121 Yet, it is 
highlighted that this person needs strong “crisis management” and “crisis 
leadership” skills, not incident command skills. It would seem that the 
moniker of “incident commander” is inappropriate and should perhaps be 
“national crisis leader,” or “national crisis manager.” The term “incident 
commander” should be reserved for those with positive control over the 
scene and responsibility for site safety and tactical control. 
• It is stated in the review, “The NRF is predicated on a ‘bottom up’ 
approach to crisis management, placing the responsibility for incident 
management at the local level, with support from the State and Federal 
governments only when the incident exceeds local capabilities. The NCP 
is a ‘top down’ approach to crisis management, in which the Federal 
Government manages the response with participation by States and limited 
participation by local governments.”122 However, the model proposed by 
this study recommends a more modular component approach that does not 
dictate a top-down or bottom-up approach. It simply adds the components 
necessary to manage that incident based on location, jurisdiction, and 
necessity. A proper comprehensive incident management framework or 
                                                 
117 Papp Jr., “Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)—Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” 4, 71. 
118 Ibid., 71. 
119 Ibid., 57. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 60. 
122 Ibid., 71. 
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model should not be predicated on a bottom-up or top-down approach 
since incidents is too dynamic to dictate such a stipulation. 
3. Conclusions regarding Deepwater Horizon 
The Deepwater Horizon event demonstrated the value of the ICS on a large 
complex and dynamic event in a non-Stafford Act scenario. However, the many flaws 
and issues of the current NIMS were on display, particularly in regards to the universal 
interpretation and implementation of such a fragmented and disjointed model. This event 
served as a great example of the need for incident management conceptual framework 
reform. That being said, while many of the observations and findings of the after action 
process were valid and will serve to improve the current model, many continue to 
propagate confusions and areas of conflict or lacking clarity, such as a definition of crisis 
in regards to incident management. 
Non-Stafford Act events that occur off-shore but impact many local jurisdictions 
would be served well by a model that is universal in its approach to incident types and 
governmental levels. If this study’s model were applied nationally, it would surely serve 
to improve response efficacy, practitioner understanding, and interoperability and 
collaboration amongst agencies. This event is a shining example that incident 
management practitioners of any type should not have to shift their paradigms based on 
the event, and in fact, have a predilection not to.  
B. 2014 DOMESTIC EBOLA RESPONSE (NON-STAFFORD ACT EVENT) 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), since March 
2014, West Africa has experienced the largest outbreak of Ebola in history, with multiple 
countries affected. The most severely impacted countries include Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
and Liberia. During this outbreak, of those who have contracted the disease, two out of 
every five have died. As of March 27, 2016, the total cases (suspected, probable, and 
confirmed) stand at 28,646, while laboratory-confirmed cases are at 15,255, with the total 
death count at 11,323. The total count of verified cases in the United States currently 
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stands at four.123 The following quote is an overview of actions taken in response to the 
Ebola outbreak found on the CDC website: 
In response to the outbreak, CDC activated its Emergency Operations 
Center to coordinate technical assistance and control activities with other 
U.S. government agencies, the World Health Organization, and other 
domestic and international partners. CDC also deployed teams of public 
health experts to West Africa. Widespread transmission of Ebola in West 
Africa has been controlled, although additional cases may continue to 
occur sporadically. However, because of ongoing surveillance and 
strengthened response capacities, the affected countries now have the 
experience and tools to rapidly identify any additional cases and to limit 
transmission.124 
According to the White House’s Office of the Press Secretary in 2014 (at the 
height of the outbreak), the President stated: 
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa and the humanitarian crisis there was a 
top national security priority for the United States. In order to contain and 
combat it, the U.S. partnered with the United Nations and other 
international partners to help the Governments of Guinea, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria, and Senegal respond while fortifying defenses at home.125  
The national strategy, as dictated by the White House, was (and continues to be) 
predicated on four key goals: 
• Controlling the epidemic at its source in West Africa; 
• Mitigating second-order impacts, including blunting the economic, social, 
and political tolls in the region; 
• Engaging and coordinating with a broader global audience; and, 
• Fortifying global health security infrastructure in the region and 
beyond.126 
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This September 2014 White House Office of the Press Secretary fact sheet127 is a 
great source of evaluation in relation to this study’s proposed conceptual model, as it 
addresses the federal government’s incident management strategies, its event type 
perspective, its interoperability intentions with other incident management components, 
and the general lexicon applied to such an event. These aspects will be evaluated to 
determine where the proposed model might have closed gaps, removed deficiencies, 
provided a better lens for evaluating the threat or incident, or is in conflict with the 
national narrative at the time.  
1. Elements in Support of the Proposed Model 
• The White House fact sheet refers to the event as a “crisis” on several 
occasions.128 Since an incident has not occurred within U.S. borders, but 
is a growing threat needing an outside response to ensure it did not 
adversely impact the organization (the organization being the federal 
government or the U.S. population) this event seems to be a perfect 
example of a crisis that could easily be justified as having a moral 
imperative for response. This event is exactly the type of crisis that could 
additionally justify the existence of a declaration of a state of emergency, 
especially since it requires the active preemptive or preventative 
coordination and collaboration of various emergency functions or 
disciplines.  
• The fact sheet refers to a “whole-of-government” approach several 
times.129 This reference demonstrates not only a need to apply incident 
management principles and concepts but also a need for various levels or 
components of the incident management structure to be applied. Much like 
the Deepwater Horizon event, this event has aspects that appear to be “top 
down”-centric, where other aspects might require a “bottom up”-centric 
approach (For example, when an infected person arrives at an airport and 
local agencies are forced to respond). This event is a perfect example of 
why a universal modular component approach to incident management, as 
is outlined in this study’s proposed model, is more appropriate.  
In addition to the “whole-of-government” approach that this fact sheet proposes, it 
also outlines the need for cooperative and collaborative efforts on an international scale, 
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particularly when it states that the “CDC has provided on the ground expertise in the 
largest international response in its history.”130 This statement demonstrates a need to 
understand, at all levels, who is filling what mission spaces. This study’s proposed model 
outlines the appropriate mission space for the “whole-of-government” approach, event 
when it includes foreign and international governments and agencies (such as the World 
Health Organization as this event did).  
2. Elements not in Support of Proposed Model 
• The fact sheet states, “More than 100 CDC personnel are on the ground in 
West Africa, and hundreds of personnel at their Emergency Operations 
Center in Atlanta have provided around the clock logistics, staffing, 
communication, analytics, management, and other support functions.”131 
This statement insinuates that specific departments, representing specific 
functions, within the federal government have their own EOCs, as 
opposed to DOCs, as this study’s proposed model recommends. As the 
CDC is one department (or office) under the larger parent organization 
being the federal government, it seems only appropriate that it should have 
a DOC that coordinates its specific functional response, where a federal 
EOC would coordinate the medical health function in relation to the other 
functions within the federal government organization. This viewpoint 
highlights an interesting area for analysis and further study. The argument 
can be made that a federal department is large enough to encapsulate 
various functions and disciplines so it should have an EOC for 
collaborative coordination and support. However, all those various 
functions, capabilities, and disciplines are still focused on ensuring the 
execution of the medical health (or more specifically, to the CDC 
epidemiological) function, which is a specific disciplinary function and 
accordingly should be coordinated via a DOC. That being said, it is an 
interesting area for continued study. It seems intuitive that the CDC 
operations center be considered a DOC where the federal government 
would have one single EOC.  
• The fact sheet states, “The Ebola epidemic reminds us that our global 
efforts to build the capacity to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to 
infectious disease threats like Ebola have never been more vital.”132 While 
it seems to be appropriate, based on the lexicon justifications provided in 
this study’s proposed model, to consider an outbreak like this Ebola 
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example a “crisis” or even a “crisis” justifying a “state of emergency,” it 
seems hardly appropriate to consider it a “threat.” Additionally, it seems 
like it would be better considered as a possibility defined as a hazard or 
vulnerability, but not a threat (unless it is used as a biological weapon) as 
no malicious intent is involved in its potential release.  
3. Conclusions regarding the 2014 Domestic Ebola Response 
The 2014 domestic Ebola response demonstrated an apparent need for a universal 
model that might be applied to all events. This event served as a great example of the 
need for incident management concepts to lend themselves to this study’s proposed 
model. The need exists to understand the difference between DOCs and EOCs, the 
difference between “threat” and “crisis,” as well as to understand and apply an incident 
management model that encapsulates components at the local and international level.  
While many of the strategies and concepts of the fact sheet are valid and will 
serve to improve or complement the current incident management model, obvious 
examples of inherent confusion, areas of conflict, or areas of lacking clarity, such as the 
definition of crisis versus threat in regards to incident management, are introduced. Non-
Stafford Act events like the 2014 Ebola crisis would be served well by a model that is 
universal in its approach to incident types and governmental levels. If this study’s model 
were applied nationally (or internationally) it would surely serve to improve response 
efficacy, practitioner understanding, and interoperability and collaboration amongst 
agencies. This event is a shining example that incident management practitioners of any 
type should not have to shift their paradigms based on the event. 
C. 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING RESPONSE (DOMESTIC 
TERRORISM NON-STAFFORD ACT EVENT) 
The following quotes are an overview narrative description of the 2013 Boston 
Marathon Bombing taken from the Boston Massachusetts after action report for the 
event:  
April 15, 2013, was a perfect day for running. The air was cool, the sun 
was shining, and the complex logistics supporting the 117th Boston 
Marathon were operating smoothly. Every participant, be they mobility 
impaired, wheelchair racer, hand-cyclist, or runner, made their way to the 
Start Line with the emotions that are typically part of Marathon Day: 
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excitement, nervousness and a heartening spirit of perseverance. By 11:00 
a.m., all 27,000 runners were on the course; by 12:36 p.m., the winners for 
each race category had been declared.133  
The heart of the Boston Marathon is not about the winners; it is about the 
less renowned runners who seek their own personal victories as they make 
their way to Boston; it is about the hundreds of thousands of spectators 
who flock to the course to cheer them on; it is about the spirit of 
community, and commitment, and sacrifice so well reflected in the 
Patriots’ Day holiday on which the Marathon takes place each year. The 
heart of the Boston Marathon is why so many people were still on the 
sidelines cheering on runners as they reached the Finish Line in the 
afternoon hours of April 15.134  
At 2:49 p.m., the race was forever changed. Two homemade improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) were detonated on Boylston Street in two 
separate locations near the Finish Line. These explosions took the lives of 
three spectators: eight-year-old Martin Richard, 29-year-old Krystle 
Campbell, and 23-year old Lu Lingzi. An additional 264 spectators were 
injured, many critically.135  
This tragic event initiated a week-long response of the public safety, 
public health, and medical communities, which culminated in the death of 
one suspect, and the capture of another. In spite of the malevolence of the 
perpetrators of these actions, countless extraordinary acts of heroism, 
bravery and community triumphed.136 
In December 2014, a multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional after action 
review was coordinated and resulted in a comprehensive after action report. This report 
details best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations related to this event.137 This 
after action report is a great source of evaluation in relation to this study’s proposed 
conceptual model, as it addresses the governmental incident management strategies 
related to threat and crisis, integration with various incident management components, 
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disciplines, levels, and the phases of incident management. These aspects are evaluated to 
determine where the proposed model may have closed gaps, removed deficiencies, 
provided a better lens for evaluating the threat or incident, or remains in conflict.  
1. Findings and Observations in Support of the Proposed Model 
• One of the key best practices identified in the after action report was the 
“strong relationships and successful unified command.”138 The report 
states, “strong relationships created and maintained by key leaders were 
paramount to ensuring commanders, agency heads, and political leaders 
came together quickly to form Unified Command and facilitate 
collaborative decision-making after the bombings in Boston and during 
the manhunt in Watertown.”139 This finding is an example of how unified 
command, a component recommended in this study’s proposed model, can 
be used effectively.  
• The timeline of events140 highlights the extreme complexity of the 
response, which justified the use of a unified command, and demonstrates 
this study’s proposal that a unified command should be used in highly 
complex incidents where a function or discipline lead is not at first 
apparent or obvious. Within the first hour of the event, simultaneous 
priorities for site safety, medical response and triage, hazardous materials 
monitoring, explosive ordinance disposal and monitoring, fire response, 
etc. occurred. This complexity, and initial scene uncertainty and disorder, 
necessitated fluidity in the unified response of various disciplines and 
required significant collaboration. Yet, not one primary priority or 
superseding priority would stipulate a single discipline or single incident 
commander model. Furthermore, as scene security was established, and 
the initial disorder transitioned to chaos then to complexity, the need for a 
unified command became no longer necessary, as demonstrated by the 
standing down of the unified combatant command (UCC) the following 
morning. This finding further supports this study’s proposal for how and 
when a unified command should be implemented, as is stated in this study 
and demonstrated in this event, a unified command exists until uncertainty 
becomes certain, as disorder transitions through chaos to complexity. It 
primarily only exists during chaos and early complexity. It necessitates 
fluidity.  
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• Another example of this event’s support of unified command concepts is 
demonstrated by the use of a separate unified command structure 
established to coordinate the manhunt in the days following the bombing 
incident.141 Due to the unknown jurisdictional whereabouts and the 
multiple mission-oriented law enforcement jurisdictions of this event, a 
single discipline or function unified command structure was established 
amongst the various law enforcement agencies involved. This finding 
serves as another example of a unified command being used during 
complex crisis management and further supports this study’s proposed 
model regarding the unified command concepts.  
• The timeline of events outlined in this after action report142 is a perfect 
example of the phases of incident management that this study’s model 
proposes. The initial minutes-to-hour after the initial bomb blasts could 
probably best be described as disorder, and the initial organization and 
activation of a unified command to address the various uncertainties and 
simultaneous priorities serves as a great example of disorder organizing 
into chaos, then the transition from chaos to complexity was best 
demonstrated as the scene became secured, victims triaged and transported 
to hospitals, HAZMAT materials concerns eliminated, EOD sweeps 
completed, and the UCC stood down the following morning (in less than 
10 hours143). Then, the continued complexity of transition occurred from 
site security and investigation to the eventual recovery of the scene, as 
well as the complexity of transitioning response personnel focus to the 
crisis management (pre-incident known active threat response) of finding 
the perpetrators who remained at large.  
• The manhunt operations144 that took place in the days following the 
bombing incident demonstrate the crisis management or response 
principles outlined in this study’s proposed model. The law enforcement 
operations conducted during those days, and the shelter-in-place direction 
given to the local population, demonstrate a response with a focus on 
prevention and protection. Since a demonstrated known active threat (two 
individuals who had demonstrated a capability to attack with malicious 
intent) had occurred, as well as various potential pre-meditated targets or 
targets of opportunity, all the necessary elements of the crisis event type 
were met. Additionally, the activities of the protection of critical 
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infrastructure,145 and the active prevention through pursuit, were 
demonstrations of the consolidated crisis management activity.  
• The after action report findings included the following two areas for 
improvement, the “need to clearly define emergency response roles and 
responsibilities within the city”, and “numerous command centers were 
not uniformly coordinated.”146 This finding is another example of how 
undefined emergency response roles continue to demonstrate national 
model conceptual and adoption deficiency and support this study’s 
problem statement. 
2. Findings and Observations not in Support of Proposed Model 
• According to the after action report, one of the best practices was the fact 
that a Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) was activated to ensure 
support for the marathon events. It goes on to state that the MACC was 
located at the state EOC.147 However, later in the document, one of the 
identified areas of improvement states that the Boston EOC was not 
activated prior to the bombings, which caused a delay in a number of 
crucial information sharing and coordination activities and recommends 
activating the EOC in support of future marathons.148 This study’s 
proposed model suggests avoiding the term “MACC” and instead calling 
centers what their post-incident name would be so as not to force 
personnel to go through an unnecessary paradigm shift and reassign a title 
to something mid-operation. Even this after action report seems to 
condone the use of the term EOC over MACC in its recommendation on 
page 87.  
• Throughout this after action report, it did not seem that the manhunt and 
the bombing were recognized as being two separate activities or events, or 
how or where that delineation threshold was determined.149 
Understanding and communicating that the manhunt was a pre-incident 
prevention and protection focused operation in a state-of-emergency much 
in the same way preparedness and mitigation actions must be taken prior 
to hurricane landfall helps the community understand the need for 
precautionary measures to be taken, and limits the perspective of overly-
reactionary or disproportionate justice measures being taken. It helps 
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demonstrate the reality of the threat, and not the potentially 
overshadowing or misinterpretation of protection or prevention measures 
as vengeance-through-justice.  
• In the timeline of events section of this after action report, it states that 
President Obama issued a declaration of emergency.150 This event type 
categorization, while at first glance seems appropriate, is probably not the 
best classification for such an event. Since the scene of the incident had 
been under positive control at that point, and a definitive imminent 
impending incident was not known, but an active imminent threat of 
incident was occurring, and since an obvious crisis was being managed, it 
would probably have been more appropriate, based on the criteria set forth 
in this study’s proposed model, to classify this event as a “state-of-
emergency” rather than an “emergency.”  
3. Conclusions regarding the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing Response 
The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing response was a perfect example of an event 
where intuition dictated appropriate response actions that fall in line with this study’s 
proposed model, further demonstrating the value of the model and the likely ease of 
implementation, and universality of its concepts and principles. Additionally, given that 
this event was not a Stafford Act event, it demonstrated the universality and broad 
relevance of this study’s proposed model. The need to understand the phases of incident 
management, dynamic incident management components and nuanced principles like 
unified command, and the value of properly framing the description, response activity 
justification, and dialogue surrounding operations and event-types can positively 
supplement an already successful operation, and potentially, turn an otherwise negative 
response positive.  
Non-Stafford Act domestic terrorism events like the 2013 Boston Marathon 
Bombing and the subsequent manhunt crisis would be served well by a model that is 
universal in its approach to incident types and governmental levels. If this study’s model 
were applied to all event types, it would surely serve to improve response efficacy, 
practitioner understanding, and interoperability and collaboration amongst agencies. This 
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event is another shining example that incident management practitioners of any type 
should not have to shift their paradigms based on the event. 
D. 2012 HURRICANE SANDY RESPONSE (STAFFORD ACT EVENT) 
The following quotes are a description of the Hurricane Sandy response, as 
described in the FEMA after action report on the event: 
Hurricane Sandy, the second-largest Atlantic storm on record, affected the 
East Coast from Florida to Maine, as well as states as far inland as West 
Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana. The storm made landfall in southern New 
Jersey on October 29, 2012, battering the densely populated New York 
and New Jersey region with heavy rains, strong winds, and record storm 
surges. The storm’s effects were extensive, leaving more than 8.5 million 
customers without power, causing widespread flooding throughout the 
region and contributing to acute fuel shortages in parts of New York and 
New Jersey. The storm damaged or destroyed hundreds of thousands of 
homes, caused tens of billions of dollars in damages, and killed at least 
162 people in the United States.151  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinated a 
large-scale Federal response that contributed to the integrated, national 
effort to support affected states and communities. In the days before 
Sandy’s landfall, FEMA worked closely with Whole Community 
partners—including all levels of government, private and nonprofit 
sectors, faith-based organizations, communities, and individuals—to 
prepare for the storm and anticipate survivor needs. The Agency pre-
positioned commodities and assets, activated response centers, and 
deployed over 900 personnel ahead of Sandy’s landfall. In the initial 
response to the storm, the Agency coordinated with its partners to provide 
Federal resources and to develop innovative solutions to address power 
restoration, transportation, fuel distribution, and housing needs. As 
recovery efforts began, FEMA continued to work with its partners to assist 
survivors and their communities. The Agency executed one of the largest 
deployments of personnel in its history, delivered over $1.2 billion in 
housing assistance to more than 174,000 survivors, and obligated over 
$800 million for debris removal and infrastructure restoration.152  
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On December 9, 2012, Mayor Bloomberg directed the Deputy Mayor for Health 
and Human Services and the Deputy Mayor for Operations to “conduct an evaluation and 
report back in a short time with recommendations on how the City’s response capacity 
and performance might be strengthened in the future.”153 This directive resulted in a 
report and 59 recommendations. The recommendations are reported to be based on 
“several months of intensive and comprehensive effort by City agencies, and include 
input from many stakeholders, including nonprofit partners, New York State agencies, 
and an extensive set of hearings held by the New York City Council.”154 This after action 
report is one of the reports evaluated for the purposes of testing the proposed conceptual 
model of this study. 
In addition to the aforementioned city after action report, FEMA completed, in 
July 2013, an after action report addressing the federal response measures taken across 
the entire eastern seaboard. According to the report:  
Despite FEMA’s many successes, the response to Sandy also revealed 
notable challenges in how FEMA coordinates with its Federal partners, 
supports state and local officials and disaster survivors, integrates with the 
Whole Community, and prepares and deploys its workforce. Difficulties 
with issuing timely mission assignments, the implementation of incident 
management structures, and meeting survivor needs early in the response 
phase are examples of challenges that emerged during Sandy.155  
This FEMA after action report will also be evaluated for the purposes of testing the 
proposed conceptual model of this study. 
These after action reports are a great source of evaluation in relation to this 
study’s proposed conceptual model as they address contrasting government level incident 
management strategies, perspectives, interoperability capabilities with other incident 
management components, and the general contrasting lexicon applied to such an event. 
These aspects are evaluated to determine where the proposed model might have closed 
                                                 
153 Linda I. Gibbs and Caswell F. Halloway, NYC Hurricane Sandy After Action Report (New York: 
NYC, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Fugate, Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report, iii. 
 114 
gaps, removed deficiencies, provided a better lens for evaluating the threat/incident, or is 
in conflict.  
1. Findings and Observations in Support of the Proposed Model 
• In the FEMA after action report under Theme 1: Ensuring unity of effort 
across the federal response, and Theme 3: Fostering unity of effort across 
the whole community, the following areas for improvement were 
identified, implementing incident management structures, and 
coordinating among states, localities, and tribes.156 This finding is a clear 
demonstration that the national incident management doctrine and 
conceptual model in its current format is not effective enough in its 
resonance with practitioners or in its implementation. This viewpoint 
supports this study’s problem statement and demonstrates a need for a 
more intuitive and effective incident management conceptual model.  
• In the FEMA after action report under Theme 1: Ensuring unity of effort 
across the federal response, the following area for improvement was 
identified, ensuring continuous improvement of disaster doctrine, policies, 
and plans.157 This finding also demonstrates and specifically calls for an 
improvement to the foundational documents that create the existing 
national incident management conceptual model. It also highlights a 
weakness in making such improvements and methods for identifying the 
best principles for doctrinal inclusion, which supports this study’s problem 
statement and may illustrate some causation. 
• In the New York City after action report, a glaring deficiency or omission 
occurs regarding the effectiveness of local incident management practices 
or operations. The after action report seems to break down the evaluation 
areas on specific capabilities or functions with little regard for incident 
management as the overarching framework of operations.158 This 
circumstance supports this study’s problem statement and the notion that a 
lacking universal understanding of, appreciation for, or application of 
incident management as a conceptual metric exists for evaluating 
emergency operations. It also supports this study’s assertion and 
practitioner survey finding that many practitioners do not know or 
consider themselves part of a larger incident management enterprise.  
• The FEMA after action reports states: 
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Until recently, FEMA lacked a formal, routine process to track and 
resolve continuous improvement actions across the Agency. 
FEMA’s Lessons Learned/Continuous Improvement Program 
(LL/CIP) is aimed at addressing this challenge by outlining 
common processes, tools, and functions for documenting and 
sharing lessons learned throughout the Agency. As part of the 
LL/CIP, FEMA has established a FEMA Continuous Improvement 
Working Group (CIWG), responsible for assigning and tracking 
continuous improvement actions that are beyond the resolution 
capability of a single FEMA component or that have Agency-wide 
implications. The FEMA CIWG includes senior-level 
representation from FEMA components and will meet at least 
quarterly. The FEMA CIWG convened its first meeting on 
February 7, 2013, and will monitor and report on the progress of 
FEMA components in addressing the areas for improvement 
identified in this report.159  
This finding supports the findings of this study, and may serve to highlight 
some of the causation for the current state of the national incident 
management conceptual model. 
• The FEMA after action report states: 
as of October 1, 2012, FEMA launched a new FQS that defines the 
training, experience, and demonstrated performance required to 
become credentialed in each of the disaster workforce positions. 
Because FQS launched shortly before Sandy, FEMA may 
adequately address the challenges noted above through planned 
activities in support of full implementation. However, in the 
interim, Sandy did reveal that FEMA may lack a coherent strategy 
to address temporary personnel shortfalls in specific FQS 
programs, especially for large-scale events.160  
This finding supports this study’s conceptual model regarding KSAs and 
highlights the need to have highly competent and trained incident 
management practitioners. 
2. Findings and Observation not in Support of Proposed Model 
• The FEMA after action report states: 
Sandy response operations in New York and New Jersey revealed 
inconsistencies in the way FEMA establishes incident management 
structures for large-scale incidents. Agency doctrine gives FEMA 
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choices of different organizational structures to meet the needs of 
an incident. During response efforts to Sandy, FEMA used an 
organizational structure that included geographical branches and 
divisions and an Area Coordination Group responsible for the two 
hardest-hit states. FEMA experienced challenges implementing 
these structures, which are designed for larger incidents. FEMA’s 
Incident Management Handbook provides guidance for three 
potential organizational constructs for disaster operations. FEMA 
most commonly uses a functional structure, organizing itself 
around the programs that it delivers. The second approach—a 
geographic structure—allows FEMA to organize by dividing its 
staff into divisions based on the geography of the affected area. 
The third approach—a combined organization structure—
combines functional and geographic approaches. For Sandy, 
FEMA chose this combined organization construct for response 
and initial recovery activities in New York and New Jersey. This 
approach was designed to facilitate centralized program decision-
making, while ensuring appropriate geographic coverage.161  
While this finding highlights difficulties in implementing various 
organizational structures, a model that this study’s proposed model 
discourages recommending instead a consistent simplified modular model 
for greatest familiarity and practitioner adoption, it proposes a solution 
that does not seem to be potent enough. It recommends simply updating its 
Incident Management Handbook to better outline command structures.162 
This solution is not effective or broad enough. The federal government 
should organize itself in a common incident management organizational 
model that reflects every other level of government or incident 
management level as proposed by this study.  
• Several of the FEMA after action report areas for improvement highlight 
confusion and inefficiencies bred from the implementation of unfamiliar 
organizational models.163 While this study’s conceptual model supports 
this area for improvement, this after action report does not go far enough 
in recommending strong areas for improvement that would support and 
endorse static and familiar organizational models to improve the 
practitioner conceptual adoption and familiarity.  
• The FEMA after action report states: 
as of October 1, 2012, FEMA launched a new FQS that defines the 
training, experience, and demonstrated performance required to 
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become credentialed in each of the disaster workforce positions. 
Because FQS launched shortly before Sandy, FEMA may 
adequately address the challenges noted above through planned 
activities in support of full implementation. However, in the 
interim, Sandy did reveal that FEMA may lack a coherent strategy 
to address temporary personnel shortfalls in specific FQS 
programs, especially for large-scale events.164  
While this statement does support this study’s conceptual model regarding 
KSAs, it does not address the areas of expertise in alignment with incident 
management enterprise practitioners and the universal modular approach 
recommended by this study’s model. 
• The New York City after action report is not organized in any way to 
reflect or evaluate overall incident management effectiveness.165 This lack 
of organization is in complete (intentionally or not) conflict with the entire 
premise of this study. Events, such as Hurricane Sandy, should always be 
evaluated through a lens of incident management efficacy and 
improvement. 
3. Conclusions regarding the 2012 Hurricane Sandy Response 
Stafford Act events should be the events where current incident management 
models are best implemented. This event highlighted with unfortunate gravity how much 
room for improvement, simplification, and standardization this study’s current model has. 
A nationally uniform, simple, and intuitive model is obviously called upon, and this 
study’s proposed conceptual model may very well be a viable part of that solution.  
This event, like the others evaluated, served as a great example of the need for 
incident management concepts to lend themselves to this study’s proposed model, and the 
need to understand and apply an incident management model that encapsulates 
components from the local to the international level. While many of the strategies and 
concepts of the two after action reports were valid and will serve to improve or 
complement the current incident management capability, obvious examples of inherent 
confusion, areas of conflict, or areas of lacking clarity do appear. Stafford Act events like 
the 2012 Hurricane Sandy disaster, and indeed all events or incidents, would be well 
served by a model that is universal in its approach to incident types and governmental 
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levels. If this study’s model were applied nationally (or internationally) it would surely 
serve to improve response efficacy, practitioner understanding, and interoperability and 
collaboration amongst agencies. This event is a shining example that incident 
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